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PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER: HOW REDEFINING
"MERCENARY" CAN TAME THE "DOGS OF
WAR"
Ellen L. Frye*
"War is far too important to be left to the generals .... [it] is also
far too important to be left to the C.E.O.s."1
INTRODUCTION
At the Harare airport on March 7, 2004, Zimbabwean authorities
held a cargo plane registered to the British firm Logo Logistics, Ltd.,2
and detained its sixty-four passengers3 on suspicion of mercenary
activity.4  Zimbabwean authorities announced that the plane
originated near Pretoria, South Africa, and that the men on board
included South Africans, Angolans, and Namibians., A senior
executive of Logo Logistics claimed the men were en route to the
Democratic Republic of Congo to work as private security for a
mining operation.6 The South African government announced that if
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to
Professor Thomas H. Lee for his guidance. I would also like to thank my family and
friends for their support, and Ben and Mathew for Africa.
1. P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms
and International Law, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 521, 549 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2. See Sharon LaFraniere, Zimbabwe: Seized Plane Adds to Coup Jitters, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 10, 2004, at A6.
3. At least twenty-seven of the Zimbabwe detainees are former members of the
South African Defence Force ("SADF"). See UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, South Africa: Guns Still for Hire for Troubled Continent, at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=40278 (Mar. 26, 2004) [hereinafter
Guns Still for Hire]. The SADF was incorporated into the South African National
Defence Force ("SANDF"), established in May 1994. Id.; see also S. Afr. Dep't of
Def., History of the South African Special Forces, at
http://www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJOps/SpecialForcesBrigade/HISTORY.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2005) (describing the history of the SANDF).
4. See Zimbabwe "Seizes US Cargo Plane," BBC News, Mar. 8, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3543651.stm.
5. See Mystery Plane Flew from S Africa, BBC News, Mar. 9, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3545507.stm; "Plane Mercenaries Are
Africans, " BBC News, Mar. 9, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3547883.stm.
6. See LaFraniere, supra note 2.
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any of its nationals aboard the plane had engaged in "mercenary"
activity they were in violation of South African law. 7
Several days later, the government of Equatorial Guinea detained
fifteen men, including South Africans and Armenians, on suspicion of
mercenary activity in connection with the Zimbabwe detainees. 8
Equatorial Guinean officials maintained that the two groups intended
to overthrow President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and
planned to install opposition leader Sevoro Moto9 in an attempt to
gain control of Equatorial Guinea's oil reserves. 10 Nick du Toit, leader
of the Equatorial Guinea detainees," claimed that he was hired by
Simon Mann, leader of the Zimbabwe detainees.12 Mann helped
found the now-defunct South African private military firm ("PMF")13
Executive Outcomes."'
In relation to the March 2003 incident at the Harare airport, Mann
was convicted in Zimbabwe, in September 2004, of illegally
7. See "Mercenary Team" May Face Death, BBC News, Mar. 10, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3497622.stm. South Africans implicated in
mercenary activity could be prosecuted under a law passed in 1998. Regulation of
Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 ("RFMAA"), 1 JSRSA 2-263 (2003),
pmbl. (S. Afr.), available at http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-acts/1998/actl5.pdf.
The Act "regulate[s] the rendering of foreign military assistance by South
African[s]... in the Republic and foreign citizens who render such assistance from
within the borders of the Republic." Id. pmbl.
8. See Q&A: Equatorial Guinea "Coup Plot", BBC News, Jan. 13, 2005, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/worldlafrica/3597450.stm [hereinafter BBC News Q&A ].
9. See Thatcher Fined over "Coup Plot," BBC News, Jan. 13, 2005, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/4169557.stm [hereinafter Thatcher Fined].
Sevoro Moto was sentenced, in absentia, to sixty-three years imprisonment in
Equatorial Guinea. Moto resides in Spain. Id.
10. See BBC News Q&A, supra note 8. Equatorial Guinea is Africa's third-largest
oil producer, after Nigeria and Angola. See Moyiga Nduru, Soldiers of Fortune Likely
to Roam Africa for Some Time, Inter Press Service, Sept. 14, 2004, at
http://ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=25463.
11. Du Toit was sentenced to thirty-four years in prison in Equatorial Guinea. See
Thatcher Fined, supra note 9.
12. Mann is a British citizen. See Profile: Simon Mann, BBC News, Sept. 10, 2004,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3916465.stm.
13. Private military firms are roughly defined as "private companies providing
security services to foreigners for profit." Global Coalition for Africa, The
Privatization of Security in Africa, at http://www.gcacma.org/PrivatizationSecurity.htm
(Mar. 12, 1999). This Note uses the term privatized military firm ("PMF") to denote
these firms. Others use "private military company" ("PMC") and "military service
provider" ("MSP") to describe the same types of organizations. U.K. Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation 3
(2002), at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf [hereinafter UK Green
Paper]; Doug Brooks, Hope for the "Hopeless Continent": Mercenaries, 3 Traders: J.
for S. African Region, July-Oct. 2000, at 1, available at
http://www.hoosier84.com/hopeforhopeless.pdf; see also Major Todd S. Milliard,
Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military
Companies, 176 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2003).
14. See BBC News Q&A, supra note 8. Executive Outcomes was officially
dissolved in 1999. See P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized
Military Industry 101 (2003).
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attempting to purchase weapons, and sentenced to seven years
imprisonment.'0 The sixty-three men arrested with Mann were
acquitted on weapons charges but convicted of breaking immigration
laws and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment.16
Sir Mark Thatcher, son of former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, and a "good friend and Cape Town neighbor"' of Simon
Mann was implicated in the plot, and detained by South African
police.,8 In January 2005, Thatcher pleaded guilty to violating the
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act ("RMFAA"),9 South
Africa's anti-mercenary law.20
On March 31, 2004, four American men were ambushed and killed
in Fallujah, Iraq.2' The bodies of two of the men were mutilated,
dragged through the streets, and hung from a bridge over the
Euphrates River.2 2 Eventually their bodies were cut down, burned,
dragged behind a cart, tied to a car, and driven away.23 These men
were not soldiers24 but civilians serving as private contractors in Iraq,
employed by the American firm Blackwater Security Consulting.25
Estimates of the total number of private security personnel in Iraq
range from 15,000 to 20,000.26 Some of these civilians carry high-end
weapons, fly helicopters, and operate their own intelligence-gathering
15. See BBC News Q&A, supra note 8.
16. See Zimbabwe Jails UK "Coup Plotter," BBC News, Sept. 10, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3643250.stm.
17. President Sues "UK Coup Plotter," BBC News, Sept. 16, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/3663844.stm.
18. Nduru, supra note 10. The BBC planned to produce a "docudrama" about the
plot centering on Simon Mann. Guy Adams, BBC Plots a "Mildly Satirical" Film on a
Very English Coup, Independent (London), Dec. 8, 2004, at 10.
19. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 1 JSRSA 2-263
(2003), pmbl. (S. Afr.), available at http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-
acts/1998/act15.pdf.
20. See Thatcher Fined, supra note 9. Thatcher was fined $500,000 and received a
four-year suspended sentence. Thatcher then left South Africa. Id.
21. See Sewell Chan, U.S. Civilians Mutilated in Iraq Attack: 4 Die in Ambush; 5
Soldiers Killed By Roadside Blast, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 2004, at Al. One of the four
killed served as a Navy Seal for twelve years. Sabrina Tavernise & Jo Napolitano,
Grief, Mostly in Private, for Four Lives Brutally Ended, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2004, at
A9.
22. See Chan, supra note 21.
23. Id.
24. See Anne Barnard & Thanassis Cambanis, Brutality, Cheers in Iraq: Mob
Drags Burned Bodies of Four Slain American Civilians Through Streets, Boston
Globe, Apr. 1, 2004, at Al.
25. See id.; see also Blackwater Sec. Consulting, Homepage, at
http://blackwatersecurity.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
26. See David Barstow, Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 19, 2004, at Al (estimating the private force to be "roughly 20,000"); Dana Priest
& Mary Pat Flaherty, Under Fire, Security Firms Form an Alliance, Wash. Post, Apr.
8, 2004, at Al (same); P.W. Singer, Outsourcing the War, Salon.com, Apr. 16, 2004, at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/04/16/outsourcing-war (estimating the
private force to be "more than 15,000").
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units.27 Civilians provided security for L. Paul Bremer III, chief of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, escorted supply convoys, and
defended locations including the Green Zone in Baghdad.2 8  The
United States acknowledges that civilian contractors in Iraq have
engaged in combat on several occasions) 9
These March 2004 incidents in Africa and Iraq expose some of the
complexities surrounding the use and activities of both PMFs and
"soldier-of-fortune"-type mercenaries. At present, there is little
law-international or domestic-regulating the activities of PMFs or
soldiers of fortune.30 International conventions purport to condemn
mercenaries, but the relevant treaties and customary norms contain
neither serviceable definitions of mercenaries nor clear guidance as to
what sorts of mercenary conduct are prohibited.3' Some soldier of
fortune and PMF "source" countries, like South Africa, have domestic
laws aimed at curtailing mercenaries, but domestic regulation has
limited extraterritorial force.32  The body of international law on
mercenaries is perceived as being definitionally narrow, prompting the
observation that "any mercenary who cannot exclude himself...
deserves to be shot-and his lawyer with him!" 33
Some have criticized this legal state of affairs and recommended
more thorough regulation or outright prohibition34 in part to prevent
violence from becoming a commodity.,, A few scholars advocate
27. See Barstow, supra note 26.
28. See id.; Phillip Carter, Hired Guns: What to Do About Military Contractors
Run Amok, Slate, Apr. 9, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2098571; Priest & Flaherty,
supra note 26;
29. See Barstow, supra note 26; Carter, supra note 28; Priest & Flaherty, supra
note 26.
30. See infra Parts IB, I.B (discussing the state of current international and
domestic law); see also Singer, supra note 1, at 525-26.
31. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 4, 64-65; Singer, supra note 1, at 525.
32. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing domestic regimes); see also Milliard, supra
note 13, at 84; Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private
International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34
Stan. J. Int'l L. 75, 139 (1998). Many scholars think there are significant problems
with prohibiting the entire industry. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 76 ("[A]
consensual military transfer between two legitimate states violates none of the
peremptory norms imposed by international legal principles of neutrality or non-
intervention."); Singer, supra note 1, at 547 ("While... a system of international
regulation would certainly provide much greater transparency in the PMF industry, it
fails to answer a number of concerns.").
33. Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the
International Law of Armed Conflicts 328 n.83 (1980).
34. See infra Part II.C (discussing scholars' proposals for mercenary and PMF
regulation); see also Marie-France Major, Mercenaries and International Law, 22 Ga.
J. Int'l & Comp. L. 103, 150 (1992); cf Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope,
Will Travel: the Global Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 1, 43
(1999) (condemning monetized violence).
35. See Sapone, supra note 34, at 43 (arguing that while military skill and violence
are "incompletely commodified," open commodification of military power "would
make the ideal of nonmonetized death impossible").
PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS
substantial restrictions on mercenaries and PMFs, while others believe
mercenaries to be an inevitable feature of the present world order and
propose reliance on market mechanisms to regulate them.36 Still
others steer a middle course, advocating permissive regulation to
channel, rather than to eliminate, the operation of irresponsible
market forces.37
This Note proposes a different sort of compromise solution-one
that puts great faith in the law but with due regard for the particular
features of the mercenary problem in the twenty-first century. The
solution is twofold. First, it articulates a new definition of
"mercenary" 
-one that can serve as a practical, enforceable means of
delimiting certain actors to regulate. 8 This redefinition of mercenary
bolsters existing and proposed international and domestic
conventions, laws, and regulations aimed at mercenaries and PMFs.
Second, it suggests specific supplemental prohibitions to target the
most egregious aspects of mercenary activity today, namely, the
mortgaging of valuable natural resources in exchange for mercenary
services and the substitution of mercenaries for state armies in core
military functions. 39
Part L.A of this Note describes the different fighting forces that
might be considered mercenaries, ° and gives examples of their typical
actions and engagements. Part I.B analyzes the existing international
and domestic laws aimed to curtail, deter, or regulate mercenary
activity.41 Part II.A examines the current definition of a mercenary
found in international and domestic law. Part II.B considers problems
and criticisms of current legal regimes. Part II.C weighs proposals for
reform of present regulatory regimes and new solutions. Part III.A
proposes a new definition of a mercenary, and Part III.B recommends
measures to deter and prevent private violence and the most
reprehensible actions of PMFs and soldiers of fortune.
36. See, e.g., Zarate, supra note 32, at 161 (finding that PMFs "may prove effective
in restoring security and order").
37. Milliard, supra note 13, at 79-84; Singer, supra note 1, at 544-46.
38. See infra Part III.A (proposing a redefinition of "mercenary").
39. See infra Parts III.B.2.a-b (proposing prohibition of assignment of natural
resources and calling for heightened public awareness of the use and status in combat
of private forces).
40. This Note's categorization of the forces that might be considered mercenaries
closely tracks that of Anthony Mockler, who put mercenaries into four groups: (1)
lone adventurers; (2) elite guards protecting heads of state, such as the Swiss Papal
Guard; (3) groups of professional soldiers, such as the Free Companies of the 16th
and 17th centuries; and (4) "respectable" mercenaries, portions of one state's army
loaned to another state. Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries: The History of the
Hired Soldier from the Congo to the Seychelles 15-16 (1985).
41. These laws include the Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions, U.N.
Resolutions, international conventions, and domestic statutes. See infra Part I.B.1
(discussing current international law).
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I. MERCENARIES: DEFINITION AND REGULATION
Mercenary activity is unsettling to a world organized by nation-
states,42 as the image of a soldier of fortune loyal to no state disrupts
the current state-oriented hegemony.4 3  Mercenaries operate now,
however, as they have for thousands of years throughout the history
of warfare." Soldiers have fought for states not their own in many of
the twentieth century's conflicts, large and small.4 1 Some of these
individuals fought for political or religious reasons;46 some fought for
money.47  Sometimes payment was made to a fighter's home state,' 8
sometimes to his private employer, 49and sometimes directly to him.50
Since at least the nineteenth century, however, states have sought to
monopolize violence.,, The dissolution of the mercantile companies,
such as the English East India Company, the campaign against piracy,
and the laws of neutrality are all instances of states' attempts to
monopolize violence.,2 Indeed the nation-state regime of the last
several centuries depended, at least ideologically, on this monopoly,
42. It must be noted, however, that the nation-state world order of today is by no
means as longstanding as the profession of mercenarism. The emergence of nation-
states is conventionally traced back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. See, e.g., Edith
B. Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 345, 346
(2000). But see Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the
Global Norm, 30 Cornell Int'l L.J. 651, 652 (1997) (arguing that nation-states existed
before Westphalia).
43. Cf Nduru, supra note 10. For an exploration of why mercenaries have
garnered so much negative attention in the latter half of the twentieth century, see
Sapone, supra note 34.
44. For a history of mercenaries in war, see Singer, supra note 14, at 19-39.
45. Mercenaries fought in the bush wars of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s and
1970s. See Dino Kritsiotis, Mercenaries and the Privatization of Warfare, Fletcher F. of
World Aff., Fall 1998, at 12.
46. Singer, supra note 1, at 531. As many as twenty-five percent of the resistance
fighters in Iraq may be foreigners. See Karby Leggett, Iraq Parley in Egypt Will Test
Bush, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 2004, at A14.
47. Sandline International's aborted contract with Papua New Guinea was worth
$36 million (following a $1,370,000 "package price reduction"). Singer, supra note 14,
at 253-54.
48. See Robert M. Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags":
The Hiring of Korean, Filipino and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War 145 (1994);
Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and
Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe 94 (1994).
49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
50. In 1975, opposition groups in the Comoros Islands hired Bob Denard to
overthrow the president, which he successfully did. Three years later, the president
that Denard had deposed hired him, and Denard successfully reinstated him. See
Thomson, supra note 48, at 93.
51. Privateering was banned in the 1856 Treaty of Paris. Declaration Respecting
Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, art. 1, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 2; see Thomson, supra note 48,
at 70-75.
52. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 69-142 (detailing the suppression of private
violence).
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and enforced it through large citizen armies.51 Since the end of the
Cold War, however, many states have scaled back their national
armies14 and become less willing to intervene in conflicts to which they
are not party. 55  Some states have struggled to maintain their
sovereignty.56 Others have failed in this struggle, and at least one
country has collapsed." In response, the supply of private soldiers
grew and the PMF industry arose.58
The emergence of PMFs starkly exposed the vacuum of regulation
and subsequently renewed calls for regulation of this sort of private
violence.19 Part III.A argues that to effectively regulate mercenaries,
including PMFs and soldiers of fortune, a solid definitional foundation
must exist.6° Thus, this Note begins with an exploration of the existing
definition of a mercenary.
A. Who Is a Mercenary?
The definition of a mercenary is unsettled in international law.
61
The precise definition carries serious consequences for those it covers,
because mercenaries are not afforded prisoner-of-war ("POW") status
53. See Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, Wash. Q.,
Summer 2002, at 85-86, available at http://www.twq.com/02summer/rotberg.pdf.
54. Milliard analogizes the end of the Cold War to the end of the Peloponnesian
War, both of which "produced a surplus of highly trained, professional soldiers in
search of employment opportunities." Milliard, supra note 13, at 11.
55. See, e.g., id. at 16. Milliard notes that the international community is now
generally unwilling "to intervene in the early stages of internal armed conflict" for
fear of "risk of casualties, or lack of national support and political will," among other
concerns. Id.
56. Rotberg defines nation-states as entities that "exist to deliver political goods-
security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental
surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and
fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications
facilities." Rotberg, supra note 53, at 87; cf. Krasner, supra note 42, at 651 ("The
whole notion of sovereignty appears fragile, incorporeal, undefinable, and perhaps
inconsequential for the modern world."). For a contrast of legal sovereignty
(sovereignty in name) with behavioral sovereignty (sovereignty in fact), see generally
Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 329 (2004).
57. Rotberg notes that "If]ailed states honor these obligations [of providing
'political goods'] in the breach." Rotberg, supra note 53, at 87. Failed states include
Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
and Sudan. Id. at 90. Both Angola and Sierra Leone employed EO in the 1990s. See
infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text. Rotberg names Somalia as a collapsed
state. Rotberg, supra note 53, at 90.
58. See Singer, supra note 14, at 8-17.
59. See infra Part II.C (discussing scholars' proposals for new regulation regimes);
see also Singer, supra note 1, at 522-24.
60. See infra Part ILI.A (redefining "mercenary").
61. See infra Part I.A (discussing the current definitions found in international
law). Attempting to regulate mercenaries, "drafters struggled to define adequately
the ancient profession." Milliard, supra note 13, at 4. Most commentators agree that
they have failed to do so. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 1, at 524 (lamenting the
definitional problems attendant to mercenary regulation).
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by the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims or International
Armed Conflicts ("Protocol I"), and so mercenaries may not receive
the treatment required by that treaty if captured during a conflict.62
International agreements regulating mercenaries contain many
specifics of who is a mercenary, including measures of such actors'
subjective motivation.63
A full exploration of any force that might be considered mercenary
requires an examination of who mercenaries are and how they are
regulated.64 This Note starts from The Oxford English Dictionary
definition: A mercenary is "a professional soldier serving a foreign
power" in exchange for "payment for his services."65 In literal terms, a
mercenary is "one who fights for an employer other than his home
state and whose motivation is economic." 66 A soldier fighting for his
country is not a mercenary. Four categories of fighter could fit the
dictionary definition of a mercenary: state-loaned soldiers, state-
recruited foreigners, corporate actors, and soldiers of fortune.6
1. State-to-State Loan
Throughout history states loaned their armies, in whole or in part,
to other states in exchange for money.61 Beginning in the sixteenth
century, Swiss cantons hired their soldiers out to foreign armies, and
Swiss soldiers still guard the Pope in the Vatican.69 Emulating the
Swiss, German states70 and Austria entered the army-for-hire market
62. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977,
art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. 4, 25 [hereinafter Protocol I]. For a thorough discussion of the
1977 Protocols, see Howard S. Levie, Recent Development in the Humanitarian Law
of War, 4 Pub. L. F. 369 (1985). The United States is not a party to Protocol I. See
Documents on the Laws of War 419-22 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed.
2000).
63. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1989, art. 1, 2163 U.N.T.S.
96, 96-97 [hereinafter U.N. Mercenary Convention]; Organization of African Unity
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, opened for signature July 3,
1977, art. 1, 1490 U.N.T.S. 96, 96-97 [hereinafter OAU Mercenary Convention];
Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
64. Scholars have spent considerable time defining mercenaries. See, e.g., Singer,
supra note 14, at 41; Milliard, supra note 13, at 6-7.
65. 9 The Oxford English Dictionary 618 (2d ed. 1989).
66. Thomson, supra note 48, at 26.
67. This categorization of forces that may be considered mercenaries is similar to
that of Mockler. See Mockler, supra note 40, at 15-16.
68. Pharaoh Ramses II hired Numidians to serve in his army; Greek city-states
specialized in certain war skills; and the Roman Empire hired Numidians, Balearics,
Gauls, Iberians, and Cretans. Singer, supra note 14, at 20-22.
69. Id. at 27.
70. The first lease of a German regiment occurred by Venice. Thomson, supra
note 48, at 28.
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in the seventeenth century.7 Later, the British, feeling the strain of
controlling their colonies around the world, hired nearly 30,000
German soldiers, many from the state of Hesse-Cassel,72 to fight the
Americans in the Revolutionary War.73
State-to-state loan of soldiers continued in the twentieth century
and not solely in the ceremonial form of the Swiss Papal Guard.14
During the Vietnam War, the United States contracted with several
countries to send soldiers to fight in South Vietnam in exchange for
direct payments to the soldiers and to their home states.75 The United
States employed South Korean,76 Filipino, and Thai troops, paying "an
overseas allowance, a per diem for each soldier, plus an additional
allowance according to rank," and "basically all expenses associated
with deploying these forces," to include the cost of replacing these
soldiers in their home army.7 Pakistani soldiers serve in the armies of
several Middle Eastern countries, 7 including Libya.79 The United
Kingdom may loan its soldiers to some of the former British colonies
in the Middle East.80 Some commentators claim that the United
Nations employs mercenaries, arguing that "at least some countries
who contribute to U.N. peacekeeping do so largely for financial
reasons.",,81
71. Singer, supra note 14, at 27. In the seventeenth century, the armies of Europe
were not citizen-national armies, but were forces of many different nationalities.
Different nationalities had their own specialties. For example, Eastern Europeans
were renowned as light cavalry and Scots as infantry. Singer observes that "[f]or the
most part, 'patriotism' was a meaningless concept to the average soldier of the
period." Id. at 28.
72. Id. at 33. In the eighteenth century, Hesse-Cassel "clearly was the most
heavily militarized state in Europe." Charles W. Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary
State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform Under Frederick II, 1760-1785, at 132 (1987).
73. See Ingrao, supra note 72, at 136. The ruler of Hesse-Cassel, Frederick I,
attempted to recruit his countrymen by assuring them that there would be "ample
pillage in America." Id. at 141-42.
74. See Singer, supra note 14, at 27, 37-38.
75. See Blackburn, supra note 48, at 145.
76. South Korea had less than 200 troops in Vietnam before 1964; by 1968 more
than 50,000 South Korean troops were deployed in Vietnam. Id. at 158; see also
Thomas H. Lee, Why Does an Empire Need Help? Explaining the Supply and
Demand for the Multilateral Exercise of Military Power in Decentralized Empires 31
(Jan. 21, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
77. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 94. Thomson observes that the Thai press
called the arrangement "mercenary." Id. Lee estimates that South Korea received
over $1.35 billion in "Vietnam-related remittances." Lee, supra note 76, at 34.
78. For a further discussion of foreigners in Middle Eastern armies, see Thomson,
supra note 48, at 90.
79. See Zarate, supra note 32, at 90.
80. The British term this practice "seconding." Thomson, supra note 48, at 27.
For a thorough discussion of state-to-state loan of soldiers throughout history, see id.
at 26-32.
81. UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 58.
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Political science professor Janice E. Thomson deems these
twentieth-century activities "disguised mercenarism."' 2 To disguise
these activities states do not just compensate foreign forces with
money. For example, Pakistan sends its troops to Saudi Arabia in
exchange for aid packages.83 Similarly, the United States did not
technically lease troops from Thailand, the Philippines, or South
Korea, but did cover all costs of their deployment and replacement.r1
While arguably "disguised mercenarism," all loaned forces of the
twentieth century have maintained that they are fighting for their
home state.85
2. State-Recruited Foreigners
Since ancient times, states have recruited foreigners to fight in their
armies. 86 The antecedent of this practice in the modern era is the
condotta (contract) system, which arose in Italy in the thirteenth
century.87 Italian city-states hired noncitizens to serve as a city-states'
soldiers through private contracts.' This practice gave rise to the Free
Companies, which formed during the Hundred Years' War (1337-
1453), and were composed of contractual soldiers, or condottieri.
Members of Free Companies were ultimately loyal to the company,
not to their employing state29
Free Companies mostly disappeared in the fifteenth century when
Charles VII of France hired several of the companies and ordered
them to defeat the others.91 The condotta system survived in Italy,
however, through the fifteenth century.9 Some condottieri came to
82. Thomson, supra note 48, at 96. The Thai press perceived the Thai troops in
Vietnam as mercenaries. Id. at 94. David Isenberg alleges that the forces were
mercenaries but were called allies "to avoid public controversy." David Isenberg, Ctr.
For Def. Info., Soldier of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today's Private Sector
Corporate Mercenary Firms 4, available at
http://www.cdi.org/issues/mercenaries/mercl.html (Nov. 1997).
83. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 90.
84. Id. at 94.
85. Id. at 97 ("In the twentieth century, foreign aid, mutual defense pacts, and per
diems have replaced eighteenth-century subsidies, leases, and direct recruiting.").
86. See Singer, supra note 14, at 20-21.
87. Id. at 22.
88. id. at 23.
89. See Zarate, supra note 32, at 84. For a full discussion of the Free Companies,
see Singer, supra note 14, at 23-26.
90. See Singer, supra note 14, at 24. Among the most successful companies were
the Great Company (composed of nearly 10,000 soldiers), the English White
Company, and the Grand Catalan Company (which ruled Athens for sixty years). Id.
at 25.
91. Id. at 26. The French army became the first standing army in Europe since the
fall of Rome. Id.; see also Milliard, supra note 13, at 9.
92. Milliard, supra note 13, at 10 & n.52.
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seize political power for themselves, 93 and the condottieri era "marked
the zenith of mercenary influence over states' affairs. '"1 4
States still recruit foreigners to serve as units in their national
armies. In 1831, King Louis Phillipe created the French Foreign
Legion in the "traditions of foreign troops who have served France
since the Middle Ages." 95  Soldiers of more than a hundred
nationalities have served in the French Foreign Legion,9 and
Legionnaires may obtain French citizenship after five years of
service. 97  The French government provides Legionnaires with
clothing, food, accommodation, medical care, and pays them at least
975 euros per month.91
The British established the equally famous Brigade of Gurkhas
after defeating these Nepalese fighters in 1816.99 Following defeat and
peace, many Gurkhas enlisted in the East India Company army.' °°
The British national army later subsumed this force. °, As of 2001,
there were 3400 soldiers in the Gurkha Brigade.12 In 2003, Gurkhas
were held to be part of the British army but not entitled to the same
93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
94. Milliard, supra note 13, at 9. The terms of the condotta, and nothing else,
governed the condottieri. See id.
95. Embassy of Fr. in the US, The French Foreign Legion, History, at
http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/legion/history.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
Presumably King Louis Phillipe was referring to Charles VII's hire of the Free
Companies in the fifteenth century.
96. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 91. The French Foreign Legion, although "of
any nationality, race or creed," is "always ready to serve France." See Embassy of Fr.
in the US, The French Foreign Legion, What Is the Foreign Legion?, at
http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/legion/what.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
97. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 91. Legionnaires initially contract for five
years of service and, between the ages of seventeen and forty, may enlist anywhere in
France with valid identification. Aside from physical fitness, there are no other
requirements. See Embassy of Fr. in the US, The French Foreign Legion, Enlistment
Requirements, at http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/legion/enlist.asp (last visited
Feb. 28, 2005).
98. See Embassy of Fr. in the US, The French Foreign Legion, Pay and Bonuses,
at http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/legion/pay.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
99. More accurately, it was the British East India Company's army that defeated
the Gurkhas. During the campaigns against the Gurkhas the British were "much
impressed by the fighting and other qualities of the Gurkha soldier." Brigade of
Gurkhas, The British Army, An Outline of the History of the Brigade of Gurkhas, at
http://www.army.mod.uklbrigade-of-gurkhas/history/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2005).
100. See id. The Gurkhas fought in Afghanistan, Burma, China, Cyprus, India,
Malaya, Malta, and Tibet. Id. In World War I, the Gurkhas fought in "France and
Flanders, Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt, Gallipoli, Palestine and Salonika." Brigade of
Gurkhas, The British Army, The World Wars and the Subsequent History, at
http://www.army.mod.uk/linkedfiles/gurkhas/The WorldWarsand-the-subsequent
_history.doc (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Brigade of Gurkhas]. Gurkhas
have been stationed in Brunei and the United Kingdom and served in both the
Falkland Islands War and the first Gulf War. See id.
101. See Brigade of Gurkhas, supra note 100.
102. See id.
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benefits as other British soldiers.103 Though citizens of other nations,
the loyalty of the Gurkhas to Britain and the Legionnaires to France
is unquestioned.' °4
The 30,000 noncitizens serving in the American armed forces'05 are
eligible to apply for naturalization after serving for one year.'6
As a general matter, state-recruited foreigners are not only strictly
controlled by the recruiting state, but become a part of the recruiting
state's national army and possibly citizens of that state. While fighting
for pay, these soldiers are not fighting for self-interested monetary
gain, but are part of their adopted state's foreign policy machine.107
This Note next turns to corporate actors of varying levels of internal
organization or coherence whose loyalty is not tied to any particular
state.
3. Corporate Actors
The Free Companies of medieval Europe were not only state-
contracted units of foreign soldiers, but companies formed to make a
profit.100 During the subsequent era of mercantile imperialism,
corporations raised private armies in the form of joint stock
companies.'" Corporations such as the English and Dutch East India
companies received charters from their home governments to
monopolize trade in a particular region, and fielded armies and fleets
to protect their trading interests. 110 By 1782, the English East India
Company employed over 100,000 soldiers, a force larger than the
contemporary British national army."' This force included Eurasians,
Indians, Swiss, and Germans." 2 In Brazil, the Dutch West Indies
Company became involved in its own land war with Portugal."3
103. R (Purja and others) v. Ministry of Def., 1 W.L.R. 289 (Eng. C.A. 2004).
104. Gurkhas and their British officers are bound together by "comradeship and
mutual respect," and Gurkhas have earned thirteen Victoria Crosses. See Brigade of
Gurkhas, supra note 100. The Victoria Cross is the United Kingdom's highest award
for bravery. See Ministry of Def., Military Honours & Awards, at
http://www.mod.uk/honours/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
105. Nina Berstein, Fighting for U.S., and for Citizenship, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15,
2005, at B1.
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1439 (2000).
107. Though the Gurkhas do not become citizens of the United Kingdom through
their service in the Gurkha brigade, they are a part of the British Army and part of
that state's military and foreign policy. See Ministry of Def, 1 W.L.R. at 289.
108. See Singer, supra note 14, at 24. The Free Companies were "permanent
military and economic organizations" that marketed themselves to prospective
employers. Id.; see also Milliard, supra note 13, at 8.
109. See Singer, supra note 14, at 34. For a full discussion of the mercantile
companies, see id. at 34-37. See also Thomson, supra note 48, at 32-41.
110. See Singer, supra note 14, at 34.
111. Id. at 35.
112. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 38.
113. See Singer, supra note 14, at 36. The Dutch West Indies Company looked out
for its own economic interests while sacrificing peace: "[W]hen Portugal sued for
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Ultimately, the home states of the mercantile companies assumed
sovereignty of their holdings and powers. 14  But during the many
years of their operations, these companies signaled a break down of
"all analytical distinctions-between the economic and political,
nonstate and state, property rights and sovereignty, the public and
private.""5
The modern PMFs are very much like the mercantile companies:
They are "structured as firms and operate as businesses first and
foremost.""6  Some are part of larger corporations and traded on
national securities markets. 7 PMFs sell small teams of commandos,
military advisers, and unarmed guards."8 These firms operate or have
operated in over fifty states, including Afghanistan, Angola, Croatia,
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, and Sierra Leone.,9 The United Nations,
nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations have
all used private security forces. 2 From 1994 to 2001, the U.S. Defense
Department spent as much as $300 billion on contracts with private
military contractors.' 2'
peace, the company lobbied hard against the treaty. Its directors argued that the
company had profited handsomely by the war, and thus [the war] should be
continued." Id.
114. Id. The Dutch East India Company operated for 194 years and the English
East India Company operated for 258 years. Id. at 37.
115. Thomson, supra note 48, at 32.
116. Singer, supra note 14, at 40. Milliard traces the antecedents of the PMF to the
Norse mercenaries of the Byzantine Empire. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 8. Zarate
analogizes them to the mercantile companies. See Zarate, supra note 32, at 147. One
student commentator calls them the "new privateers." Matthew J. Gaul, Comment,
Regulating the New Privateers: Private Military Service Contracting and the Modern
Marque and Reprisal Clause, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1489,1489 (1998).
117. Military Professional Resources, Inc. ("MPRI") is a subsidiary of L3
Communications, which is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange under
ticker symbol LLL. See L-3 Communications, Divisions, at http://www.l-
3com.com/divisions (last visited Feb. 28, 2005); L-3 Communications, Investor
Information, at http://www.l-3com.com/investor-relations/investor-info (last visited
Feb. 28, 2005). PMFs "organize themselves as multinational commercial entities that
pursue particular economic goals," and "are outside the State and may function as a
'war machine,' autonomous and unrelated to the State." Sapone, supra note 34, at 13.
118. See UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 19 9-10; Singer, supra note 1, at 521. It is
widely believed that it is rare for PMFs to directly engage in combat. UK Green
Paper, supra note 13, TT 9-10.
119. See UK Green Paper, supra note 13, T1 10; Singer, supra note 1, at 522. The
Defense Department, however, claims to not know the actual number of contractors
it employs overseas. Renae Merle, More Civilians Accompanying U.S. Military:
Pentagon Is Giving More Duties to Contractors, Wash. Post, Jan. 22,2003, at A10.
120. UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 12. PMFs are an attractive solution for
"certain non-governmental organizations, such as humanitarian relief agencies who,
caught in the full heat of warfare, view the prospect of hired help as an essential shield
for their supply convoys and field operations." Kritsiotis, supra note 45, at 13.
121. See Laura Peterson, Privatizing Combat, the New World Order, in Making a
Killing: The Business of War (Ctr. For Pub. Integrity, ed.), at
http://www.publicintegrity.orglbow/report.aspx?aid=148 (last visited Feb. 23, 2005)
(noting that "[b]ecause of the limited information the Pentagon provides and the
breadth of services offered by some of the larger companies, it was impossible to
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The two particular PMFs repeatedly analyzed in scholarship are the
now-defunct Executive Outcomes ("EO"), of South Africa,122 and
Military Professional Resources, Inc. ("MPRI"), of the United
States.23
EO formed in South Africa during the transition from apartheid to
democracy.2 4 The company primarily worked for African states and
received as payment mining and oil concessions in these nations.125
Founded in 1989, EO was linked to the South African Defense Force
and to mining and oil extraction companies.126 Originally employed to
train South African military forces and to conduct "marketing
warfare" for clients such as De Beers, 27 EO soon found itself working
outside South Africa in mining security and drug raids and finally for
sovereign states.128
Contrary to general practice, EO employees participated in combat
directly. In Angola, EO operatives flew helicopters in combat, and in
Sierra Leone helped state forces retake four townships from the rebel
Revolutionary United Front ("RUF").129 The former U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries as means of impeding the right
of people to self-determination ("U.N. Special Rapporteur"),13 °
Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, alleged that EO "rival[ed] a function
determine what percentage of these contracts was for training, security or logistical
services"); see also Singer, supra note 1, at 522.
122. Executive Outcomes ("EO") is likely the best known PMF. See Singer, supra
note 14, at 101. For a full discussion of EO, see id. at 101-18.
123. See, e.g., Tina Garmon, Comment, Domesticating International Corporate
Responsibility: Holding Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 11 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 325, 331-37 (2003) (discussing both EO and
MPRI); see also Milliard, supra note 13, at 11-14; Sapone, supra note 34, at 2.
124. See Isenberg, supra note 82, at 6.
125. See Zarate, supra note 32, at 147.
126. See Singer, supra note 14, at 101-02.
127. See id. at 107; see also DE Beers Group, Home, at
http://www.debeersgroup.com/debeersweb (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
128. See Singer, supra note 14, at 107. Singer fully details EO's operations. Id. at
106-15.
129. The RUF, led by Foday Sankoh, used child soldiers to fight the Sierra
Leonean government. See Brutal Child Army Grows Up, BBC News, May 10, 2000, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/743684.stm; see also Child Soldiers to Be
Disarmed, BBC News, May 25, 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/low/uk/764230.stm.
For background information on the phenomenon of child soldiers, see Amy Beth
Abbott, Child Soldiers-The Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 Suffolk
Transnat'l L. Rev. 499 (2000); Veronica Escobar, Comment, Reclaiming the "Little
Bees" and the "Little Bells": Colombia's Failure to Adhere to and Enforce
International and Domestic Laws in Preventing Recruitment of Child Soldiers, 26
Fordham Int'l L.J. 785 (2003).
130. On July 13, 2004, Dr. Shaista Shameem was appointed as the U.N. Special
Rapporteur. Press Release, United Nations, Shaista Shameem Appointed Special
Rapporteur on the Use of Mercenaries (Aug. 20, 2004), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsfl0/5A4399EEA5788CF1C1256EF6002AB
C88?opendocument. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros served as the U.N. Special
Rapporteur from 1987 to 2004. Id.
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traditionally assigned to the State, namely, security ... includ[ing] the
organization of the armed forces." 3' Although EO officially dissolved
in 1999, political scientist Peter Singer notes that many spin-offs of
EO are still active, including Alpha 5, Cape International, Lifeguard,
Sandline, and Saracen.13 2
MPRI has been called "the primary player in private military
service contracting.' ' 13 The company's databases include over 12,500
former defense and law enforcement professionals.11 Founded in
1987 by eight former senior military officers, many of MPRI's
employees are former U.S. military officers and soldiers. 35
United States government officials recommended MPRI for some
of the corporation's first contracts, including those in Bosnia,
Colombia, Croatia, and Nigeria. 36 Indeed, the links between the U.S.
government and MPRI in the NATO Bosnia campaign caused some
European allies "to question how one would know if a MPRI
employee was really a retired officer, or still active with the [Defense
Intelligence Agency], and whether it made a difference in the end."'' 37
In 1994, the Pentagon licensed MPRI to assist the Croatian Ministry
of Defense and provide Croatian officers with "classroom instruction
in democratic principles and civil-military relations to [those]
previously accustomed to the Soviet model of organization. ' ' 138 Four
months after this democracy training began, Croat forces launched
"Operation Storm," a massive, sophisticated offensive against the
Serbian army, an assault that "carried a Western-style imprint that
131. Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Human Rights, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 7, J
64, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/24 (1997).
132. See Singer, supra note 14, at 118; see also Christopher Wrigley, Campaign
Against Arms Trade, The Privatisation of Violence: New Mercenaries and the State, at
http://www.caat.org.uk/information/issues/mercenaries-1999.php (Mar. 1999)
(discussing the web of EO-connected firms).
133. Gaul, supra note 116, at 1493. MPRI is "perhaps the most dynamic U.S."
PMF, advertising abilities in "airborne operations, civil affairs, close air support,
counterinsurgency, force integration, foreign affairs, joint operations, intelligence
(both strategic and tactical)." Milliard, supra note 13, at 11-13.
134. L-3 Communications, MPRI Our Mission, at
http://www.mpri.com/site/mission.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2005); L-3
Communications, MPRI Our Team, at http://www.mpri.com/site/ourteam.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2005).
135. See Singer, supra note 14, at 119. "Although there is a general uneasiness at
the concept of retired American military personnel trading commercially on skills and
contacts developed while in public service, those within MPRI say that the firm is
distinguished by its professionalism and loyalty to U.S. foreign policy goals." Id.
MPRI has acknowledged that it has accessed United States intelligence at high levels.
Id. at 120-21.
136. See id. at 121.
137. Id. (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 126 (footnote omitted).
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appears to bear evidence of MPRI's assistance" in combat training or
strategy.139
For all intents and purposes, PMFs are heirs of the Free Companies
and joint stock companies of previous eras. They operate as private
companies that offer military services to foreign countries for pay.
This Note next examines soldiers of fortune, the archetypal
mercenaries.
4. Soldiers of Fortune
Known as soldiers of fortune, "Wild Geese," dogs of war, and les
affreux ("the dreaded ones"),140 these fighters are "the ideal type of a
mercenary." 1 41 Until the rise of PMFs, these soldiers of fortune, many
with military experience, were the main actors in the private military
market. 142  They operated in weak states for any government,
corporate entity, or individual willing to pay them. 14 The golden age
of these fighters was the 1950s and 1960s in sub-Saharan Africa, where
notorious men like "Mad" Mike Hoare and Bob Denard sold their
military services to the highest bidder.1" More recently, mercenaries
operated in the former Yugoslavia, and for "the last days of the
Mobutu regime in Zaire" (now Democratic Republic of Congo).' 45 In
1976, thirteen men were tried as mercenaries in Luanda, Angola, and
four were executed.146 In spite of their reputation, the number of
soldiers of fortune acting in any conflict generally has been small, and
soldiers of fortune mostly have been ineffective.' 47
Having examined the four different types of forces that may be
considered mercenaries, this Note turns to the international and
domestic conventions, laws, resolutions, and declarations that regard
and regulate mercenaries.
139. Id. at 127 (noting the "commonly accepted belief" that MPRI provided
training in "basic infantry tactics (such as covering fields of fire and flanking
maneuvers,), and medium-unit strategy and coordination as well"); see also Milliard,
supra note 13, at 14 (finding MPRI's help to the Croatian army, if true,
"remarkable"). MPRI denied that they assisted with Operation Storm, claiming that
the Croatian forces "'could have got [sic] a battle plan just as well from Georgetown
University."' Singer, supra note 14, at 126.
140. See Zarate, supra note 32, at 87; see also Herbert M. Howe, Global Order and
the Privatization of Security, Fletcher F. World Aff., Fall 1998, at 3 ("The Congolese
during the 1960s labeled mercenaries as les affreux for often despicable behavior.").
141. Thomson, supra note 48, at 26.
142. Singer, supra note 14, at 37.
143. See id.
144. See id. Denard attempted coups in the Comoros Islands and the Seychelles.
id.
145. Id. at 43-44. Additionally, Ukrainian mercenaries are alleged to have
operated in Algeria, Angola, Bosnia, Chechnya, Croatia, Democratic Republic of
Congo (formerly Zaire), Guinea, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan. Id. at
44.
146. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 94.
147. See id. at 95.
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B. Mercenary Regulation
International acceptance of private militaries waned with the rise of
the nation-state in the sixteenth century, when citizens became more
closely associated with their national governments.' 48 As nations
formed, new states attempted to monopolize violence and began to
reign in private violence. 149
Attempts at controlling mercenarism first came in the form of the
neutrality laws, passed in the nineteenth century and early twentieth
century.50 After World War II, with the formation of the United
Nations and the decolonization of Africa, the international
community began to focus on the problem of mercenaries again.'
Part I.B.1 examines the international conventions, resolutions, and
declarations on mercenaries. Part I.B.2 explores state regulation of
mercenaries through domestic laws.
1. International Law
International law can be found in three different sources: treaties,
customary international law, and general principles of law (jus
cogens). 52 Treaties are binding only on their signatories. Customary
international law arises when a predominant number of states follow a
certain practice out of a sense of opinio juris (a sense of legal
obligation evidenced by state practice). 153 The Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Restatement")
similarly recognizes a rule of international law as one that has been
"accepted as such by the international community of states" as
"customary law," "by international agreement" or "derivation from
general principles common to the major legal systems of the world.' ' 54
The Restatement defines customary law as "result[ing] from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation."'' 5  International agreements can give rise to
148. Singer, supra note 14, at 31. Indeed, state-monopolized violence is perhaps the
key characteristic of a state. Thomson writes that "[alccording to Weber, one of the
essential characteristics of the state is that it 'successfully upholds a claim to the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order."'
Thomson, supra note 48, at 7 (quoting Max Weber, The Theory of Social and
Economic Organization 154 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1964)).
149. See Singer, supra note 14, at 31-32; Thomson, supra note 48, at 69-142.
150. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 78-84.
151. See Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 114 (2d ed.
2000).
152. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
102(1) (1987) [hereinafter Restatement].
153. Id. §§ 102 cmt. c., 103; see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law
8-9 (3d ed. 1979).
154. Restatement, supra note 152, § 102(1).
155. Id. § 102(2). One scholar has further split customary international law into
"traditional custom" and "modern custom." Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional
and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 Am.
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international law "when such agreements are intended for adherence
by states" and are accepted., 6
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") provides that the ICJ shall apply both "international
conventions" and "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law," and "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." '157 United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions can be evidence of customary international law,,"8 and
Protocol I may also be considered customary international law.15 9 The
convergence of domestic regulations may be evidence of international
law.16° Part I.B.l.a examines treaties and customary law regarding
mercenary use.
a. Treaties of Broad Ratification
The first international statement on mercenaries is found in Hague
Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land of 1907 ("Hague V"), the
first formal pronouncement of the modern international laws of war."'
Hague V addresses the duty of states with respect to mercenaries and
other states; it does not cover treatment of mercenaries themselves.162
Under Article 4 of Hague V, neutral powers are prohibited from
forming mercenary armies or allowing recruitment of mercenaries on
J. Int'l L. 757, 757 (2001). Law professor Arthur A. Weisburd argues that treaty law
only goes beyond declaration and becomes customary international law when "states
acknowledge, at least in principle, a duty to make reparation for its breach." Arthur
M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 Vand. J.
Transnat'l L. 1, 9 (1988). Weisburd argues that
it makes [no] sense to label as international law rules that many states will
not obey and that very few states are willing to enforce against violators. If
one were to accept this view, the world would soon witness repeated
violations of rules that scholars insisted were legally binding. Thus, the
discipline of international law would in effect be describing itself as
ineffectual....
Even beyond this prudential point there are questions of intellectual
honesty at issue here.
Id. at 45.
156. Restatement, supra note 152, § 102(3).
157. Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature June 26,
1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 1989 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 77.
158. Brownlie, supra note 153, at 14-15.
159. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing Protocol I); infra Part
I.B..a.ii (same).
160. Restatement, supra note 152, § 102(4) ("General principles common to the
major legal systems... may be invoked as supplementary rules of international law
where appropriate.").
161. Hague Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague
V].
162. Id.
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their territory.63 No duty exists, however, to prevent mercenaries
from passing through a neutral state's territory.16
The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War ("POW Convention") does not mention mercenaries
at all.165 The POW Convention affords POW status to soldiers "who
have fallen into the power of the enemy."'166 Though silent on the
specific status of mercenaries, some scholars believe that the POW
Convention drafters intended to confer POW status on mercenaries.67
In any event, the POW Convention does not criminalize mercenary
activity.168 Common Article 3, found in all four of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, does provide minimum protections to be applied
in international and non-international conflict.69 It mandates that all
"[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities," including combatants
who have stopped fighting, must be treated "humanely. '"110 Those
falling under common Article 3 protection cannot be tortured or
subjected to "outrages upon personal dignity." 7 ,
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter requires that all states "refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state."1 2 States
may only use force in self-defense or by authorization of the U.N.
Security Council173 In essence, the U.N. Charter reinforces the
sovereignty of all its members.1 74 Regarding mercenaries, this general
doctrine was expanded upon by a series of U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions, and finally by a multilateral convention.
b. Customary International Law with Specific Relevance to
Mercenaries
Beginning in the 1960s, in an effort to stave off progress toward
African self-determination, colonial powers enlisted the use of
163. Id. art. 4, 36 Stat. at 2323.
164. Id.
165. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135 [hereinafter POW Convention]. The United
States has ratified the POW Convention. Id. For a full discussion of the POW
Convention, see W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of
Irregular Combatants Under the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 39 (1977).
166. See POW Convention, supra note 165, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 138-40.
167. Milliard, supra note 13, at 22.
168. See POW Convention, supra note 165, 6 U.S.T. at 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. at 135.
169. See, e.g., id. art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
173. Id. art. 51.
174. See id. art. 2, para. 4.
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mercenaries.175 In response, international and regional organizations,
and one nation, attempted to define, regulate, and even outlaw
mercenaries. These agreements, along with the more recent Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), are
examined below.176
i. U.N. Resolutions
Beginning in 1965, the U.N. General Assembly passed a series of
five resolutions on sovereignty and the use of mercenaries. Adopted
unanimously, Resolution 2131 declares that "[n]o State has the right
to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State.' 77 General Assembly
Resolution 2465 was the first resolution that specifically addressed
mercenaries. Resolution 2465 stated that "using mercenaries against
movements for national liberation and independence is punishable as
a criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves are outlaws.' ' 78 It
also urged all governments to enact domestic legislation making the
"recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries in their territory"
a punishable offense. 79
The next General Assembly resolution, Resolution 2625, passed by
consensus vote, proclaimed that states have only a "duty to refrain
from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or
armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of
another State."' 0 Thus, Resolution 2625 represented a retreat from
Resolution 2465, in allowing states to tolerate mercenary activity so
long as they do not organize or encourage mercenaries.' 8'
In 1973, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3103, the
declaration on Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants
175. See Green, supra note 151, at 114 ("In view.., of the number of mercenaries
who enrolled in colonial armies or were prepared to serve for pay in campaigns
directed against national liberation groups, widespread agitation among third world
states resulted in the condemnation [of mercenaries].").
176. See infra Part I.B.l.b.v (discussing use of the Rome Statute to prosecute use of
mercenaries and crimes relating to mercenarism).
177. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 12, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1965).
178. G.A. Res. 2465, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968).
179. Id.
180. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123,
U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
181. See id.; Milliard, supra note 13, at 27. Indeed, "states are not prohibited from
knowingly tolerating mercenary activities that lead to incursions in other states." Id.
This is very much the idea of Hague V. See Hague V, supra note 161, arts. 4-7, 36 Stat.
at 2323. Milliard argues that Resolution 2625 was incorporated into customary
international law by the ICJ. Milliard, supra note 13, at 27; see Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 187-92 (June 27) (separate
opinion of Judge Ago).
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Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist
Rgimes, with eighty-three votes, thirteen votes against, and nineteen
abstentions.82 This resolution declared the use of mercenaries by
colonial and "racist r6gimes" a criminal act and mercenaries
punishable as criminals.,8 Resolution 3103 was thus a return to the
themes of Resolution 2465, being specifically concerned with self-
liberation movements struggling against "alien domination" and
colonial and "racist rdgimes."' 8
The next year, in 1974, the General Assembly attempted to define
aggression with Resolution 3314 and the Definition of Aggression.8
The Definition of Aggression explicitly mentions mercenaries, and
equates aggression with, among other things, "[t]he sending by or on
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries.11' 86
Adopted by consensus, Resolution 3314 defines a state's responsibility
to respect other states' sovereignty.187
The U.N. Security Council also issued several explicit, narrow,
incident-specific, and admonitory resolutions relating to mercenaries
during the 1960s.l 8 For example, the Security Council demanded
"immediate withdrawal of all external armed forces and mercenaries,
together with the military equipment used in the armed attack against
the territory of the Republic of Guinea. '' 189 More than once the U.N.
Security Council condemned Portugal for allowing mercenaries to
operate from within its colonial holdings.190
182. G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 142,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
183. Id. at 142-43.
184. See id.; G.A. Res. 2465, supra note 178, at 4.
185. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR Special Comm. on the Question of Defining
Aggression, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142-43 & annex, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)
[hereinafter Definition of Aggression].
186. Id. at 143.
187. Id. The Definition of Aggression attempts to bolster the U.N. Charter by
refining the definition of aggression, a key term found in the U.N.'s purpose and in its
Chapter VII powers (under which the U.N. "determine[s] the existence of any... act
of aggression" and can then act "to maintain or restore international peace and
security"). Id.
188. Green, supra note 151, at 114-15. These resolutions were not Chapter VII
resolutions, and therefore not obligatory. Id. at 114.
189. S.C. Res. 289, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1558th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/289
(1970).
190. S.C. Res. 241, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1378th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/241
(1967); S.C. Res. 239, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1367th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/239
(1967); S.C. Res. 226, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1306th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/226
(1966).
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ii. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts
In 1977, Protocol 119, deprived mercenaries of POW status for the
first time.' 92 Article 47 provides that:
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a
prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is any person who:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a
Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess
of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and
functions in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) Is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;
and
(f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict
on official duty as a member of its armed forces.193
Article 47 clearly denies POW status to those falling under the
definition.' 94 If a person is found to be a mercenary under Protocol I,
he is then either a noncombatant and afforded civilian status, or an
unlawful combatant and afforded protection under Article 75 of
Protocol 1.191 Article 75 prescribes that unlawful combatants "shall be
treated humanely in all circumstances," and may not be subjected to
torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, "outrages upon personal
191. See Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25. The United States is
a signatory to Protocol I, but did not ratify it. Documents on the Law of War, supra
note 62, at 404.
192. For commentary on the humanitarian rights of captured mercenaries
contemporary to the drafting of Protocol I, see Documents on the Laws of War, supra
note 62, at 419-22. See also Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987);
Captain John Robert Cotton, Comment, The Rights of Mercenaries as Prisoners of
War, 77 Mil. L. Rev. 143 (1977). Cotton argues that if guerillas are afforded POW
status, as they ultimately were, mercenaries should also be afforded POW status. Id.
at 164.
193. Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
194. See id.
195. Green, supra note 151, at 115.
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dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatments," collective
punishment, or be threatened with any of the foregoing.96
iii. Regional Initiatives in Africa
The International Commission of Inquiry on Mercenaries ("Luanda
Commission"),197 created by the Angolan government in 1976, issued
its own Draft Convention on the Suppression of Mercenarism
("Luanda Convention").98 At the time of the Luanda Commission's
genesis, thirteen foreigners were on trial in Luanda, Angola, for
mercenary activity.19 Four of the men were subsequently sentenced
to death and executed.? °  The Luanda Convention declared
mercenarism an international crime "committed by the individual,
group or association, representatives of the State and the State
itself."201
The Luanda Convention declared the crime of mercenarism an
obstacle to the self-determination of states.2° Accordingly, states
must prevent mercenarism and any related activities from occurring
within their respective jurisdiction.23 If a state does not prevent these
activities the state itself is guilty of mercenarism °4 The Luanda trial,
Commission, and Convention have been criticized as overbroad in
their actions and prohibitions.205
African states formed the Organization of African Unity ("OAU")
in 1963.206 The OAU Charter, like the U.N. Charter, sought to
196. Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37. The United States
rejected Article 47 as not part of customary international law. Milliard, supra note 13,
at 37.
197. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Mercenaries, Draft Convention on the Prevention
and Suppression of Mercenarism (1976) [hereinafter Luanda Convention], reprinted
in Paul W. Mourning, Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment and Use
of Mercenaries, 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 589, 615 app. 11 (1982).
198. For background on and analysis of the Luanda trial, Commission, and
Convention, see the eyewitness accounts found in Wilfred Burchett & Derek
Roebuck, The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today 205-12 (1977), and George H.
Lockwood, Report on the Trial of Mercenaries: Luanda, Angola, June, 1976, 7
Manitoba L.J. 183 (1977).
199. Burchett & Roebuck, supra note 198, at 206.
200. Id. at 212.
201. See Luanda Convention, supra note 197, art. 1, at 616.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See F.J. Hampson, Mercenaries: Diagnosis Before Proscription, 22 Neth. Y.B.
Int'l L. 3, 27 (1991).
206. Milliard, supra note 13, at 43; see Charter of the Organization of African
Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 70. The Organization of African Unity became the
African Union in 2000. Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, 2158
U.N.T.S. 33.
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preserve the sovereignty of its members and was, at the time of its
formation, the largest regional organization in the world.2
In 1977, one year after the Luanda Convention and trial, the OAU
issued its own Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in
Africa ("OAU Mercenary Convention").2°8  The OAU Mercenary
Convention uses a definition of "mercenary" nearly identical to that
found in Article 47 of Protocol 1.209 Although Article 47 requires that
the expected monetary gain be more than that of regular combatants,
the OAU Mercenary Convention merely requires that mercenaries
anticipate and desire monetary gain of any amount.210  The OAU
Mercenary Convention, however, only applies to those fighting
against "a process of self-determination, stability, or the territorial
integrity of another [OAU] State."21 An OAU state could use
mercenaries in any other capacity.2 2  The OAU Mercenary
Convention contains no enforcement mechanism and relies on
member states' compliance and their enactment of domestic laws.13
The OAU Mercenary Convention has been largely ignored.2 14
iv. 1989 U.N. Mercenary Convention
In 1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries ("U.N. Mercenary Convention").25 The U.N. Mercenary
Convention incorporates the definition of mercenary found in Article
47 of Protocol I, and applies it to all conflicts, international and
internal. It also adds a further specification of mercenary activity.16
Under the U.N. Mercenary Convention, a mercenary:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the
constitutional order of a State; or
207. Milliard, supra note 13, at 43-44.
208. OAU Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, 1490 U.N.T.S. at 96.
209. See Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
210. See OAU Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 1, 1490 U.N.T.S. at 96.
211. Id. at 97.
212. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 55-56 (supplying hypothetical situations where
mercenaries could be used or would go unpunished under the OAU Mercenary
Convention's definition of mercenary).
213. See OAU Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 6, 1490 U.N.T.S. at 97-98;
Singer, supra note 1, at 529.
214. See Singer, supra note 1, at 529.
215. U.N. Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, 2163 U.N.T.S. at 96.
216. For a contemporary discussion of the humanitarian law status of mercenaries
after the adoption of the U.N. Mercenary Convention, see generally Edward
Kwakwa, The Current Status of Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict, 14
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 67, 74 (1990).
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(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment
of material compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which
such an act is directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose
territory the act is undertaken.21 7
Article 5(1) of the U.N. Mercenary Convention prohibits states
from "recruit[ing], us[ing], financ[ing] or train[ing] mercenaries," so
defined, for any end.218 Thus, no state may use mercenaries under any
circumstances. 219 The U.N. Mercenary Convention also provides
procedures for extradition of captured mercenaries.2-
Drafted in 1989, the U.N. Mercenary Convention required
ratification by twenty-two states.221 In 2001, Costa Rica became the
twenty-second state party.222 Subsequently Belgium, Guinea, Mali,
and New Zealand ratified the U.N. Mercenary Convention, bringing
the total number of state parties to twenty-five.223
v. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
The ICC, established in 2002 by the Rome Statute, is a permanent,
treaty-based court committed to the principle that crimes of serious
concern to the international community must be punished.224 The
Rome Statute reaffirms a principle of the U.N. Charter, that no state
may use force against another.225 The ICC has jurisdiction over four
crimes-genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
217. U.N. Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 1, 2163 U.N.T.S. at 97.
218. Id. art. 5, 2163 U.N.T.S. at 97-98.
219. Id.
220. See id. art. 10, 2163 U.N.T.S. at 99.
221. Id. art. 19, 2163 U.N.T.S. at 101.
222. 2 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General 112 (United
Nations 2003) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
223. 2 Id.; Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General-Treaty I-
XVIII-6, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty
6.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
224. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, pmbl., 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, 91 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
225. Id.; see U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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aggression-the last left undefined at the time of the Rome Statute.26
The 1974 Definition of Aggression included mercenarism as an act of
aggression,227 and may be a future source or inspiration for an ICC
definition of the crime of aggression. If the crime of aggression is
defined to include either state use of mercenaries or some crime of
mercenarism itself, the ICC could become a forum for mercenary
prosecution.28
The United States is not a party to the ICC,229 but has many laws
that may be used to regulate mercenaries and PMFs. 230 Discussion of
these laws and other states' domestic laws follows.
2. Domestic Law
The first domestic laws that may be applied to mercenaries did not
address mercenaries per se, but required state neutrality.1 Since a
state was considered responsible for the belligerent acts of its citizens
or subjects, the acts of a citizen as mercenary could be attributed to
his state. From the late eighteenth century, neutrality laws that
addressed this problem evolved into specific domestic legal regimes
governing mercenary conduct. 232
a. Antecedents in Neutrality Laws
Neutrality laws give sovereign states the exclusive power to make
war, a power that may be considered the highest expression of
sovereignty.233 The United States passed the world's first neutrality
226. Rome Statute, supra note 224, art. 5, 2187 U.N.T.S at 92. The Rome Statute
may be amended beginning seven years after its enactment, not before. Id. art. 121,
2187 U.N.T.S. at 156.
227. Definition of Aggression, supra note 185, at 143 & annex. Likewise, the
International Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security
'of Mankind includes the sending of mercenaries in its definition of acts of aggression.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, art. 15 4(g), 30 I.L.M. 1584, 1588 (1991).
228. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 67-68.
229. Although the United States initially signed the Rome Statute, on May 6, 2002,
the Secretary-General received notice that "the United States does not intend to
become a party to" the Rome Statute and "[a]ccordingly, the United States has no
legal obligations arising from its signature." 2 Multilateral Treaties, supra note 222, at
146 n.6.
230. E.g., Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2000); Arms Export Control Act,
22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2000) [hereinafter AECA]; Neutrality Act, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 (1794).
It is possible that the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) [hereinafter ATS],
could be used to prosecute mercenaries committing human rights abuses abroad. See
infra notes 427-31 and accompanying text.
231. See infra Part I.B.2.a (discussing early neutrality laws).
232. See infra Part I.B.2.b (discussing modern anti-mercenary laws).
233. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 7. Thomson notes that sovereignty is an
"interesting practice because it is not an objective fact but a claim whose viability
depends fundamentally on an intersubjective understanding." Id. at 84. For a
discussion of the theory of national sovereignty, see id. at 11-18.
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law in 1794,234 likely prompted by fear of being drawn into the
Napoleonic Wars.235  With the Neutrality Act, Congress2 36 declared
that any citizen within the United States that "accept[s] and
exercise[s] a commission to serve a foreign prince or state in war by
land or sea.., shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor. 237 The
Neutrality Act was the first domestic law to address the legality of
hostile expeditions against foreign states launched from U.S. soil.
238
This law served as a model for the rest of the world: Between 1794
and 1938, forty-nine states passed some manner of neutrality law.
239
The Neutrality Act's jurisdiction did not extend to activity conducted
exclusively outside the United States and its territory, such that
American citizens could only be punished for crimes committed onU.S. soil.14°
Britain's Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 prohibits enlistment of
British citizens in the armed forces of a foreign state at war with
another foreign state, if the latter state is at peace with Britain.241
Recruitment for such purpose is also prohibited.21 2 More recently, a
handful of states have passed domestic laws aimed at more discreet
aspects of mercenary activity.
b. Twentieth Century U.S. Laws Regulating Private Transfers of
Military Technology and Services
In the twentieth century the United States passed laws aimed at
both preserving neutrality and regulating the flow of military
hardware and knowledge. The U.S. Foreign Relations Act prohibits
234. See Neutrality Act, 1 Stat. at 381-84.
235. Thomson, supra note 48, at 77. For a discussion of circumstances surrounding
passage of the 1794 Neutrality Act, see id. at 77-78. Scholars disagree about
Congress's motivation for passing the Neutrality Act. Some scholars contend that
Congress passed the Neutrality Act in response to Britain's use of Hessian
mercenaries in the Revolutionary War. See, e.g., Allaoua Layeb, Mercenary Activity:
United States Neutrality Laws and Enforcement, 10 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L.
269, 272 (1989) (citing a "general antipathy.., toward the use of mercenaries, due to
the unpleasant experiences the United States had with the Hessian... soldiers
(mercenaries) who fought for the British").
236. The Constitution also gives Congress the power to "grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. For discussion of the Marque and
Reprisal Clause as a mechanism to regulate mercenary activity, see infra note 426.
237. Neutrality Act, ch. 50, 1 Stat. at 381-82; see Sapone, supra note 34, at 29
(discussing passage of the Neutrality Act of 1794). For a thorough history of United
States neutrality laws, see generally Layeb, supra note 235.
238. Thomson, supra note 48, at 79.
239. Id. at 80-81 tbl. 4.2.
240. Neutrality Act, ch. 50, 1 Stat. at 381-84; see Sapone, supra note 34, at 31-32
(citing United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977)). Nevertheless, the
Neutrality Act was the most Congress could do to distance the U.S. government from
privateering and individual citizens' foreign involvement in military activities.
241. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90, § 4 (Eng.).
242. Id. § 5.
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recruitment of American citizens on U.S. soil for service in a foreign
army, if that army is fighting a state with which the United States is at
peace. 243 It does not prohibit an individual from leaving the United
States to enlist in a foreign army, whatever the status of that state in
relation to the United States.2" The Foreign Relations Act has never
been used to prosecute mercenaries.245
The Arms Export Control Act ("AECA") of 1968 regulates arms
dealing and sale of military services.246 Under the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"), which implement the AECA,247 any
company offering military advice, services, or sales to foreign
nationals must first obtain a license from the U.S. State Department,
whether this transfer occurs in the United States or abroad.248 Under
ITAR, Congress must be notified before the export of military
services in excess of $50 million. 249
The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), which governs
behavior of U.S. military forces, as originally written did not cover
civilians abroad, including those working side by side with American
soldiers.250 The 2004 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
extended the UCMJ to civilians "employed by or accompanying the
Armed Forces outside the United States, '"251 but does not apply to
American civilians employed by a foreign government or U.S.
agencies outside the Armed Forces.52
243. Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2000).
244. Id. §§ 956-960.
245. Sapone, supra note 34, at 33-34. Sapone notes that "[w]hen there is war
between the United States and a foreign State, mercenaries are immune from
prosecution." Id. at 33. Sapone cites United States v. Elliot, "which concerned a
conspiracy to destroy a railroad bridge in the Republic of Zambia," and where "the
U.S. district court held that the statute applied because the United States was 'at
peace' with Zambia." Id. at 33-34; see United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Elliot, the defendant also challenged the Foreign Relations Act
as unconstitutional because it had never been used prior to the instant case. The
court rejected this claim. Id. at 325-26.
246. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2000). The AECA is also known as the Foreign Military
Sales Act. The AECA provides that sales of arms to other states "be approved only
when they are consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States." Id.
247. International Traffic in Arms Regulation, 22 C.F.R. § 120.8 (2004).
248. Id. § 120.1.
249. Reporting of Offsets Agreements in Sales of Weapon Systems or Defense-
related Items to Foreign Countries or Foreign Firms, 15 C.F.R. § 701.1, 701.3(a)
(2004).
250. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2000) [hereinafter UCMJ];
see Singer, supra note 1, at 537.
251. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3267 (2004).
252. See Singer, supra note 1, at 537.
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c. South Africa's RFMAA
In 1998, largely in response to the activities of EO in Angola and
Sierra Leone, South Africa passed the RFMAA.21 The South African
constitution provides that the country must "live in peace and
harmony" and thus South African citizens may not "participat[e] in
armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in
the Constitution or national legislation.
' 254
The RFMAA prohibits mercenary activity within South Africa,
including recruitment, training, or financing of such activity.25 A
citizen or permanent resident of South Africa may not "offer to
render any foreign military assistance" to another state, group, entity,
or person without permission from the government.256  Foreign
military assistance includes "military services or military-related
services, or any attempt, encouragement, incitement or solicitation to
render such services," where services are defined as advice; training;
personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence, or operational support;
personnel recruitment; medical or paramedical services; and
procurement of equipment.257 Security services for individuals or
property involved in armed conflict are also subject to regulation, as
are coup attempts and any furtherance of the military interests of a
party to an armed conflict.258 To obtain permission to offer military
assistance a firm must submit an application to the National
Conventional Arms Control Committee; the Committee approves or
disapproves it and sends it on to the South African Minister of
Defence for final approval. 29
253. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 1 JSRSA 2-263
(2003), pmbl. (S. Afr.), available at http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-
acts/1998/actl5.pdf.; see UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 69 annex B, at 39. It has
been alleged that the RFMAA is so sweeping as to prohibit "academics giving talks
on military topics abroad." Can Anyone Curb Africa's Dogs of War? The Economist,
Jan. 16, 1999, at 41 [hereinafter Africa's Dogs of War].
254. See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 1 JSRSA at 2-
263, pmbl., available at http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-acts/1998/actl5.pdf.
Many South Africans fought in the "bush wars" in other African nations during the
period of apartheid in South Africa and de-colonization in sub-Saharan Africa. See
Alexandra Fuller, The Soldier; What Did the War Do to the Men Who Fought It?, New
Yorker, Mar. 1, 2004, at 54, 56.
255. See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 1 JSRSA at 2-
263, pmbl., available at http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-acts/1998/actl5.pdf.
256. Id. 3.
257. See id. 1.
258. See id. An armed conflict includes "any armed conflict between" armed forces
of states, armed forces of a state and an internal armed group, or any armed groups
no matter their nature. Id. 1.
259. See id. $ 1, 4-5, 1 JSRSA at 2-263 to 2-264. The Committee submits quarterly
reports of all registered foreign military assistance authorizations to the President,
Parliament, and the Parliamentary Committees on Defence. See id. 6, 1 JSRSA at 2-
264..
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The RFMAA explicitly states that authorization of foreign military
assistance may not be granted if the proposed action conflicts with
international law, would result in human rights violations, would
destabilize or "negatively influence the balance of power" in the
region, would "support or encourage terrorism," would affect South
Africa's interests, or is "unacceptable for any other reason."2 6
A conviction for violation of the RFMAA may result in punishment
of a fine or imprisonment, and forfeiture of any equipment involved in
the activity.26I The RFMAA may be applied extraterritorially, such
that "[a]ny court of law... may try a person for an offence ...
notwithstanding the fact that the act or omission ... was committed
outside" South Africa, except in the case of a foreign citizen
committing all acts outside South Africa.262
Australia,263 Canada,26 Denmark,26, Finland,266 Greece,267 Italy,268 the
Netherlands,269 Norway, 270 Portugal,271 Russia,272 Switzerland,273 and the
260. Id. $ 7, 1 JSRSA at 2-264.
261. See id. 8.
262. Id. $ 9.
263. Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act, 1978, c. 13 (Austl.). The
Act does not apply to actions done in "relation to the defence of Australia." Id. § 5.
There have been few successful prosecutions, "but the Act is thought to have value as
a deterrent." UK Green Paper, supra note 13, $ 69 annex B, at 40.
264. Foreign Enlistment Act, R.S.C., ch. F-28 (1985) (Can.). It is a violation of the
Act to "leave[] or go[] on board any conveyance with a view to leaving Canada with
intent to accept any commission or engagement in the armed forces of any foreign
state at war with any friendly foreign state." Id. § 4. It is also an offence within
Canada to "induce[] any other person to leave or go on board any conveyance with a
view to leaving Canada, with a like intent," whether the inducer is Canadian or not.
Id. There have been few successful prosecutions under this legislation. UK Green
Paper, supra note 13, 69 annex B, at 40.
265. Danish law prohibits recruitment in Denmark "for foreign war service," but
no recent prosecutions have occurred. UK Green Paper, supra note 13, $ 69 annex B,
at 41.
266. Finnish law prohibits recruitment of Finnish citizens for armed service in
another state. "Crimes committed by Finnish citizens or residents abroad can be
punished... provided that they are punishable also in the country where they were
committed .... [Finland also] provides for universal jurisdiction concerning crimes
against international law, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity." Id.
267. Recruitment of mercenaries in Greece is illegal. Id.
268. Italy prohibits "hiring, using, financing or training of mercenaries." Id.
269. "Since 1984 it has been illegal.., for Dutch nationals to enter military service
for a nation with which the Netherlands is at war or is about to be at war." Id. at 42.
270. Norway criminalizes "recruitment, without the King's permission, of troops in
the realm for foreign military service" and "also criminalises the formation,
participation in or support of a private organisation of a military character." The
Norwegian Act was passed "to prevent Norwegians from participating in the Spanish
civil war." Id.
271. "The activity of Portuguese nationals engaged in mercenary activity abroad is
banned under provisions of the Portuguese Criminal Code." Mercenary activity
includes "combat activities but not advice or technical assistance to foreign military
forces." No citizen has been prosecuted for these offenses. Id.
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Ukraine 274 have passed anti-mercenary laws. Of African states, only
South Africa, with the RFMAA,275 has passed an anti-mercenary
domestic law.276
Having surveyed types of extra-state forces and privatized soldiers,
and the existing international and domestic laws aimed at regulating
them, this Note turns to critiques of the current legal regime.
Additionally, Part II examines suggestions for reform of the current
regimes, and new methods and mechanisms of mercenary and private
force regulation.
II. CURRENT AND PROPOSED OPTIONS FOR MERCENARY
REGULATION
Current laws have very little actual effect on mercenary activity,
although there are a number of multilateral conventions and
potentially controlling domestic laws in key source jurisdictions.177
Additionally, current international law simply does not contemplate
PMFs,278 nor is it equipped to handle foreign fighters of mixed
religious or ideological and economic motivations, also known as
"confessional mercenaries. ' 279
Much of this difficulty stems from definition. Enrique Bernales
Ballesteros, the former U.N. Special Rapporteur, acknowledges that
defining "mercenary" is complex, if not impossible.2 8  Perhaps the
drafters of twentieth-century international mercenary law "confused
the principles of jus ad bellumsl and jus in bello,282 thereby producing
272. Russia criminalizes the "recruitment, training or financing of mercenaries, and
participation by a mercenary in an armed conflict." Id. at 43.
273. "The Penal Code prohibits Swiss nationals from joining a force that is
designed to fight abroad. The sole exception is the Vatican Swiss Guard. Between
1994 and 2000, seventeen persons were sentenced for having served in foreign armed
forces" including the French Foreign Legion. Id.
274. "Ukrainian legislation gives a basis for prosecution in the event of non-
combatant support (eg [sic] medical) of a mercenary force. Ukraine ratified the 1989
UN Convention in 1993." Id.
275. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 1 JSRSA 2-263
(2003) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-acts/1998/actl5.pdf.
276. Angola and Sierra Leone, site of EO's activities, have not passed anti-
mercenary laws. It is questionable whether they could enforce them if they had.
Angola and Sierra Leone hired EO because they were Weak states, unable to use,
trust, or furnish their own national army. See Singer, supra note 1, at 535-36, 541. For
more on weak states, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
277. Singer, supra note 1, at 531.
278. Singer claims that PMFs are not recognized by any international laws. See id.
at 533.
279. Id. at 531. Singer believes that current international law "would not be of
assistance in dealing with the many Arab fighters employed on behalf of the Taliban
in Afghanistan." Id. at 531-32.
280. Id. at 534.
281. The jus ad bellum are the "rules governing when use of force is lawful." Derek
Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 Harv. Int'l L.J. 367, 370 n.10
(2004).
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questionable and ultimately tenuous attempts at international
regulation."2 3 Moreover, while international pronouncements on
mercenaries urge states to pass domestic law and categorically
condemn mercenary activity, no monitoring or enforcement
mechanisms have been established at the international level,2s8 and
any domestic legal regime faces enforcement issues both within a
state's boundaries and abroad.
Part II.A explores the problems with the definition of a
"mercenary" found in existing legal regimes. Part II.B outlines
commentators' critiques of current international, regional, and
domestic law, and these regimes' potential applicability to PMFs. In
addition, it raises issues of national sovereignty and the security
problems presented by failed states, both of which are implicated in
all current and prospective legal regimes.85 Part II.C examines
scholars' suggestions of how soldiers of fortune and PMFs might be
effectively regulated, deterred, or banned.
A. Who Is a "Dog of War"? Defining "Mercenary"
While definitions of mercenaries do exist in international law, these
definitions (indeed, they are nearly the same definition) have been
criticized. The current international definition is extremely narrow. 86
Article 47 of Protocol I defines a "mercenary" as a foreign combatant
recruited to fight in one specific conflict and motivated by the desire
for private gain in an amount in excess of the payment to the armed
forces of the recruiting state. 87 The U.N. Mercenary Convention
drops Article 47's final requirement, and a mercenary thus need only
be motivated by private gain of any amount 2 8 To be a mercenary, a
combatant must not have, in any way, the permission or sanction of
his home state under the U.N. Mercenary Convention, the OAU
Mercenary Convention, or Article 47 of Protocol 1.289
Moreover, under the current regime a combatant may be
considered a mercenary only if he is hired for one specific and finite
engagement2 ° Both the South African firm EO and the U.S. firm
282. The jus in bello are the "rules governing the conduct of war." Id.
283. Milliard, supra note 13, at 3-4.
284. See Singer, supra note 1, at 545 (citing a "void in monitoring mechanisms").
285. See infra Parts II.B-C (discussing the current regulatory regime and outlining
scholars' proposals for reform).
286. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 71-72 (enumerating the available exclusions
from mercenary status found in the current definition of "mercenary").
287. For a definition of "mercenary" see Article 47's definition, supra note 193 and
accompanying text.
288. Compare Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25, with U.N.
Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 1, 2163 U.N.T.S. at 97.
289. U.N. Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 1, 2163 U.N.T.S. at 97; OAU
Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 1, 1490 U.N.T.S. at 96; Protocol I, supra
note 62, art. 47,1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
290. Singer, supra note 1, at 532.
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MPRI, however, while not maintaining a standing army, maintain
databases of employees.21 EO often contracted an employee for a
period of time not tied to a specific conflict.292
These hyper-specific definitions are likely a product of the post-
colonial period in which these international laws came into being, and
of some states' reluctance to prohibit the use of combatants who are
noncitizens. The international community passed most of the
regulations, resolutions, and conventions in response to the mercenary
activities in Africa immediately following decolonization, an
environment that no longer exists and only existed for a short time.293
Domestic laws suffer from many of the same problems as
international laws, in that they often look to international laws for a
definition of mercenary, or simply mirror the definitions found
there.294 Singer criticizes the RFMAA's definition of a mercenary,
noting that the definition is very broad, "making it almost
irrelevant. "295
B. Other Problems with Existing Legal Regimes
Definitional ambiguity creates problems for the existing
international and domestic regimes. Even if the definitions of
mercenary were clear, the current regimes would still suffer from the
problems of providing unclear legal status in the jus in bello, lack of
monitoring and enforcement, no extraterritorial force, and no
transnational coordination. Mercenary use and its prohibition also
raise complex issues for both source states and weak or failed states.
1. International Regimes
Current international regimes do not make clear what status PMF
employees and mercenaries would be afforded if captured in combat.
Additionally, the existing international laws make no mention of
PMFs and provide no enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. An
example of the failure of international law is the OAU's regional
regime, which prohibits the use of mercenaries against, but not by,
OAU member states.296
291. Id.; L-3 MPRI, MPRI Our Team, at http://www.mpri.com/site/our-team.html
(last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
292. Singer, supra note 1, at 532. Singer notes that "[d]espite fighting for pay in
other nations' wars, personnel of Executive Outcomes would not meet the
[mercenary] standard." Id.
293. Milliard, supra note 13, at 4. Some also view the international community's
mercenary laws as disproportionately focused on the African soldiers of fortune. E.g.,
James L. Taulbee, Myths, Mercenaries and Contemporary International Law, 15 Cal.
W. Int'l L.J. 339, 339-42 (1985) (providing examples of mercenary activity in Africa).
294. See Singer, supra note 1, at 536-37.
295. Id. at 540; see Africa's Dogs of War, supra note 253.
296. OAU Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, arts. 1, 6, 1490 U.N.T.S. at 96-98.
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a. The Status of Mercenaries in Combat
Assuming one could determine who a mercenary is, it is still not
clear how he ought to be treated if captured in combat. Hague V set
out responsibilities of states and rules for belligerents regarding
mercenaries, but did not prohibit or seek to deter mercenaries, nor did
it define their status.
297
The 1949 POW Convention protects the rights of lawful combatants
in international wars.298 The POW Convention, by its silence on the
status of mercenaries, appears to include mercenaries in those
afforded POW protection.29  The United States ratified the POW
Convention, and thus presumably would confer POW status on a
mercenary captured in combat.
Article 47 of Protocol I explicitly revoked a mercenary's POW
status.3°° In place of POW status, mercenaries ostensibly would
receive the protections of Protocol I's Article 75,301 which are similar
to common Article 3 protections. The United States has not ratified
Protocol I, and in fact the U.S. Ambassador explicitly rejected Article
47 as not being part of customary international law.3 2
The U.N. General Assembly Resolutions purported to criminalize
mercenarism while not explicitly denying POW status.3 3
In any event, Singer argues that "the exact legal threshold of what
constitutes participation in [a] conflict is certainly open to question."3°4
A U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General has stated that civilian
contractors who operate weapons "that are a critical node in overall
297. Hague V, supra note 161, 36 Stat. at 2310-31; Singer, supra note 1, at 526.
298. Singer, supra note 1, at 526.
299. Id. at 526-27.
300. Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25. For commentary
contemporary to this revocation, see generally Cotton, supra note 192.
301. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
302. Milliard, supra note 13, at 41-42 (quoting United States Ambassador George
H. Aldrich).
303. United Nations General Assembly resolutions are non-binding. Green, supra
note 151, at 114. The U.N. Charter authorizes the General Assembly to "discuss any
questions or any matters" and to "make recommendations to the Members of the
United Nations or to the Security Council." U.N. Charter art. 10. In contrast, the
Security Council is charged with the "maintenance of international peace and
security," and United Nations member states "agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council." Id. arts. 24-25. "International organizations
generally have no authority to make law, and their determinations of law ordinarily
have no special weight," though they may indicate what voting states believe the law
to be. Restatement, supra note 152, § 103 cmt. c. While "[i]nternational agreements
create law for the states parties thereto," customary international law only arises
where the agreements "are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact
widely accepted." Id. § 102(3) (emphasis added). Resolutions, particularly those of
the General Assembly, if adopted by consensus or near unanimity, are given
substantial weight, and may reflect customary international law, but still may not be
afforded the full effect of law. Brownlie, supra note 153, at 14.
304. Singer, supra note 1, at 532.
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combat operations" could be considered unlawful combatants."'
Singer is unclear about whether PMF employees could be considered
mercenaries, and thus what status they would be afforded in the jus in
bello.306
Even if judged unlawful combatants, PMF employees have many
avenues to escape the mercenary label. While not the armed forces of
a national government, PMF employees work not as individuals but as
personnel of a firm for (most likely) a sovereign power (or a
corporation).307 PMFs could incorporate their employees into a
nation's armed forces (as the Sandline company did in Papua New
Guinea in 1997) and thus escape mercenary status.3°8 Finally, if a PMF
obtains a license from a government (any government) it might be
considered "sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on
official duty," 309 and thus evade mercenary status.3 0 Indeed, Singer
finds that the only real legal sanction available against PMFs under
the current international legal regime is that their employees might
lose their rights in war if captured. 311
Discussing the legal status of armed contractors in Iraq, Phillip
Carter, a former U.S. Army officer, claims that these contractors fall
into a "legal gray zone" being neither noncombatants (because they
are armed) under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,312 nor lawful
combatants (because they do not wear uniforms or fall into the
military hierarchy) under the POW Convention.311
More recently, mercenarism was excluded from the Rome Statue of
the ICC. 14  The 1974 Definition of Aggression, U.N. General
305. Id. at 534.
306. Id. Indeed, it is not clear how soldiers-of-fortune mercenaries would be
treated by a country that has not ratified the U.N. Mercenary Convention. Green
notes that they could receive either non-combatant civilian status or unlawful
combatant status. Green, supra note 151, at 114, 117.
307. Singer, supra note 1, at 532. Singer argues that the firms are thus quasi-state
actors. Id.
308. Id. at 532-33. Sandline employees were made "special constables" of Papua
New Guinea. Id. at 533. To avoid being labeled a mercenary PMF employees may
even obtain citizenship from an employer government. Id.
309. U.N. Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 1, 2163 U.N.T.S. at 96-97.
310. Singer, supra note 1, at 533.
311. See id. at 534. Mercenaries are not afforded POW status under Article 47 of
Protocol I. Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25. A PMF employee
would, however, have to fit into Article 47's narrow definition of a mercenary. Id.; see
Singer, supra note 1, at 534.
312. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 290 (defining
civilian).
313. Carter, supra note 28. Carter claims that armed contractors in Iraq "fall into
the same gray area as the unlawful combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."
Id.
314. Rome Statute, supra note 224, art. 7, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 93-94.
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Assembly Resolution 3314,15 included mercenarism as a crime of
aggression, but crimes of aggression were left undefined in the Rome
Statute of the ICC.316 Mercenarism might fall into a definition of
crimes of aggression, but this remains to be seen.
b. No Contemplation of PMFs
None of the existing international legal regimes even contemplate
the existence of PMFs. The most recent mercenary regulation, the
U.N. Mercenary Convention, "had extremely poor timing," in that it
was issued just as the private military trade began to shift to the PMF
model away from soldiers of fortune. 7 With respect to PMFs, Singer
finds that international law is altogether "too primitive.., to handle
such a complex issue that has emerged just in the last decade."3,8 As
demonstrated above, it is unclear whether PMFs even fall into the
current definition of a mercenary. Furthermore, the answer to that
question in current international law depends on the particular regime
being analyzed.
c. No Monitoring or Enforcement Mechanisms
The U.N. Mercenary Convention, the most recent regime, lacks
both enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.319 Not one permanent
member of the U.N. Security Counci32° ratified the U.N. Mercenary
Convention,32 and no mercenary has been prosecuted under it.322
State parties include Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Ukraine, all of which permitted or
benefited from mercenary trade since signing or ratifying the U.N.
Mercenary Convention.323 Singer finds that, because these states
permitted or benefited from mercenary activity, the U.N. Mercenary
Convention is actually "anti-customary law."324
d. Regional Regimes: The Organization of African Unity
The OAU Mercenary Convention forbids the use of mercenaries to
violate the sovereignty of another OAU member state but permits use
of mercenaries in OAU internal conflicts, or to violate the sovereignty
315. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 185, at 143 & annex.
316. Rome Statute, supra note 224, art. 5, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 92.
317. Singer, supra note 1, at 531.
318. Id. at 526.
319. Id. at 531.
320. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. U.N. Charter art. 23.
321. 2 Multilateral Treaties, supra note 222, at 115.
322. See Singer, supra note 1, at 531.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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of nonmember states.325  Furthermore, the OAU Mercenary
Convention calls for passage of domestic laws and relies on individual
compliance of the member states. Only South Africa has an anti-
mercenary domestic law, and OAU states generally have not
complied with the convention.3 26 Like international regimes, domestic
regimes suffer from problems beyond those of definition. Apart from
South Africa,327 no state has one coherent law regulating PMFs or
mercenaries. Rather, some states-for example, the United
States 328-have a patchwork of laws and rules. These conglomerates
lack transnational harmonization and extraterritorial force (both
jurisdictionally and in terms of monitoring capability). Furthermore,
like international regulatory schemes, domestic laws can create
sovereignty implications for both source states and receiving states.
2. Domestic Regimes
Few states have laws regulating mercenaries, and only South Africa
has passed a law regulating PMFs specifically. Still, the United States
has a pastiche of laws and regulations pertaining to transfer of arms
and military services. These laws are examined below.
a. An Overlapping Patchwork of Rules
The United States, though it does have a significant body of law
regulating both enlistment in foreign armies and sale of military goods
and services, provides an example of the inadequacy of domestic
laws. 29  The UCMJ extends to civilians "employed by or
accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States,"33° but
does not apply to American civilians employed by entities other than
the Pentagon3, Nor are the foreign states where American civilians
operate likely to prosecute PMF employees, either because the PMF
is doing "the state's dirty work," the state lacks enforcement
capability, or the PMF is actually fighting the regime in power.32 PMF
employees are thus effectively unaccountable1 33
As proof of this unaccountability, Singer offers the example of the
DynCorp employees who engaged in statutory rape, promoted
prostitution, and took bribes, all while working for the U.S.
government as part of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and
325. See OAU Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 1, 1490 U.N.T.S. at 96-97;
see also Singer, supra note 1, at 529.
326. Singer, supra note 1, at 529.
327. See id. at 539.
328. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
329. Singer, supra note 1, at 537.
330. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
331. See Singer, supra note 1, at 537.
332. Id.
333. See id. at 537-38.
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Kosovo. 3 34 DynCorp removed their offending employees from the
former Yugoslavia before the employees could be arrested, and these
employees were never held accountable for their actions. 335
Notwithstanding this employment history, the United States
subsequently contracted with DynCorp to assist with the training of
the Iraqi police force following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.336
If PMF contracts involve arms transfers, the contracts fall under the
arms control regulations of ITAR.337 Although official government
approval is required, confusion surrounds this process.338 As long as
the contract is for less than $50 million, 339 a PMF does not need to
notify Congress of its proposed actions. 34°  Licensing itself is a
somewhat hollow measure. Although the U.S. embassy in the
receiving country is officially charged with oversight of the contract,
no specific monitoring or follow-up is required after the initial license
is granted.3'
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS")342 may be a source of deterrence in
U.S. law, as foreign victims of human rights abuses at the hands of
American PMF employees might be able to sue these employees and
their employer in U.S. courts.343
b. Extraterritoriality, Under-Enforcement, Lack of Transnational
Coordination, and the "Reincorporation Problem"
A particular domestic regulation regime is generally only effective
within that sovereign state.- South Africa's RFMAA is a model
domestic law, but one with limited force extraterritorially, in part
because of its lack of monitoring mechanisms. Monitoring
334. Id. at 538.
335. See id. Singer alleges that the two "whistleblower" DynCorp employees were
in fact fired for bringing the conduct to light. Id.
336. See id. DynCorp, however, has taken steps to redress the problem: All its
"employees [must] sign a written statement that they understand that human
trafficking and prostitution are 'immoral, unethical, and strictly prohibited."' See id.
That DynCorp was subsequently hired to perform more work for the United States
undermines the argument of some that the market will adequately control PMFs. See
infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the possibility of market regulation).
337. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120 (2004); see Singer,
supra note 1, at 538.
338. See Singer, supra note 1, at 538-39.
339. 22 C.F.R. § 120.8.
340. See Singer, supra note 1, at 539.
341. See id. Singer points to a 1998 incident in Colombia in which a PMF
mistakenly bombed a village instead of a rebel holding. The United States declined to
work with the Colombian government to hold the PMF employees accountable. Id.
342. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
343. See Garmon, supra note 123, at 339 (discussing the ATS as a possible method
of both punishing and deterring human rights abuses by PMF employees).
344. Singer, supra note 1, at 536. "[F]ew issues are more troublesome than an
attempt by one state to exercise legal powers within another state's sovereign
territory." Id.
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mechanisms are so lacking, in fact, that the South African minister
who sponsored the Act "admitted that his nation would be dependent
on journalists to help it enforce its law.'345
Because domestic laws are neither universal nor uniform,
mercenary firms may "escape" an inhospitable state by
reincorporating elsewhere. 3' 6 As businesses with no absolute national
ties, PMFs can simply trade a hostile national legal regime for a
friendly one.347  They may also simply change names, as when
Capricorn Air re-registered itself as Ibis Air.348 Additionally, because
of the possibility of escape, domestic legislation is not a long-term
solution, and may only create a race to the bottom, in which firms
move to weak states, with minimal or nonexistent monitoring and
enforcement capabilities. 349 While several U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions called mercenaries "outlaws, '' 350 they simultaneously
"placed the burden of enforcement exclusively on state regimes," who
have rarely been willing or able to comply.351
Domestic laws mostly ignore the specific problem of PMFs.352
Domestic laws often either defer to international law or, like
international law, are unable to define PMFs.353
The United States and South Africa are the only countries that have
enacted laws directly aimed at regulating PMFs.354 The United
Kingdom produced a "Green Paper ' 315 regarding PMFs, but that
government has yet to legislate on the subject.356
345. Id.
346. Id. at 535. The UK Green Paper shares Singer's concern, noting that firms
may "mutate." UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 35.
347. Singer, supra note 1, at 535. In fact, this may have occurred with EO after
South Africa passed the RFMAA. Spin-offs of EO are still operating and before EO
disbanded, founder Eben Barlow remarked that other African nations expressed
interest in becoming the firm's host state. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. Such a scenario is analogous to some theories of why so many American
corporations incorporate in Delaware, a state of relatively lax corporate law. Milliard,
supra note 13, at 84; see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 666 (1974).
350. Resolutions 2465 and 3103 expressly termed mercenarism and use of
mercenaries a crime. G.A. Res. 3103, supra note 182, at 143; G.A. Res. 2465, supra
note 177, at 4.
351. Singer, supra note 1, at 527.
352. Id. at 524 ("[A]II but a few states' domestic statutes currently ignore PMFs'
very existence.").
353. Id. at 536-37.
354. Id. at 540. Milliard praises these laws as "the best domestic [PMF] regulations
to date." Milliard, supra note 13, at 80.
355. UK Green Paper, supra note 13. A "Green Paper" is a policy paper and
makes no formal recommendations. See Singer, supra note 1, at 540 n.79.
356. Singer, supra note 1, at 541. Singer notes that London is "a hub for many
PMFs." Id.
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c. Interference with Source-State Sovereignty
If a PMF works for a state, it could be considered "sent by a State
on official duty," thus falling out of the current mercenary
definition. 357 Determining whether a PMF is working at the behest of,
or at least with the sanction of, its home state is not simple. When
Sandline International, a British PMF, violated U.N. sanctions by
providing military assistance to the deposed government of Sierra
Leone, the firm claimed it had governmental approval3 58 The British
government denied this charge.359
Furthermore, source states could be dragged into a war they have
no interest in fighting.36 If American civilians are attacked, killed, or
kidnapped while working in a state with which the United States is not
at war,36' it is unclear what duties the United States owes to those
civilians in theory and in practice. 61
d. The Particular Problem of Failed States
PMFs are unlikely to commit abuses in strong states with robust
public armed forces, such as the United States (they are also unlikely
to carry out military operations in strong states).363 More likely, PMFs
will operate (indeed have operated) and commit abuses in weak states
such as Sierra Leone and Angola.364 But the states most needful of
and best situated to implement PMF regulation, these receiving states,
are often the most incapable of achieving regulation in practice.36
357. U.N. Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, art. 1, 2163 U.NT.S. at 97.
358. Africa's Dogs of War, supra note 253.
359. Id. For further discussion of this incident, see Wrigley, supra note 132.
360. UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 63; Gaul, supra note 116, at 1491.
361. If the civilian is working in a state at war with the United States, there is
already evidence of what will occur. A former United States Air Force Captain, Kirk
von Ackermann, vanished while working for a Turkish contractor near Tikrit, Iraq, in
November 2003. The United States military turned the search over to local Iraqi
police and gave them von Ackermann's photograph to assist in their search. See
Singer, supra note 26.
362. See also Gaul, supra note 116, at 1491. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario
of the United States armed forces entering a country to rescue civilian contractors and
subsequently being drawn into armed conflict with that state. The British government
contemplates just such a scenario in its Green Paper. UK Green Paper, supra note 13,
63. South Africa averted a similar situation in the 2003 incident in Equatorial
Guinea. There, South Africa had promised to intervene if any of its citizens involved
in the coup plot received the death penalty. All were spared, and South Africa did
not intervene. Coup Plotters Jailed in E Guinea, BBC News, Nov. 26, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4044305.stm.
363. See Singer, supra note 1, at 536.
364. Id. at 535. Indeed the states most likely to hire PMFs for combat or near-
combat operations are weak states. Singer cites the example of Sierra Leone, which
"could not control its own capital, let alone monitor and punish the actions of an
outside military firm." Id.
365. Cf Rotberg, supra note 53, at 86-87 (detailing the symptoms of a failed state,
including its inability to provide security and government).
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Effective regulation thus would have to come from an outside strong
state, but this may implicate problems of sovereignty.66
Even if a PMF's home state does attempt to regulate extraterritorial
activity, as South Africa does, it may be difficult to know what goes on
in the receiving state. Again, this raises the issue that weak states are
often PMF clients.367 Because it is lacking in organization and central
government-the very reasons that a state resorted to hiring the
PMF-it may be especially difficult for the employing state to control
the PMF and for people not on the ground to know what is
happening.36 s
In addition to the regimes imposed or proposed by states, scholars
have formulated means and regimes to deter and regulate
mercenaries. Some scholars hope for self-regulation and market
control. Still others believe that a combination of international
oversight and harmonization of domestic law will achieve adequate
control. Finally, a few seek to ban and end all privatized violence out
of a concern for the moral implications of such violence and the
impact it may have on self-liberation movements. Each of these
categories of solution are examined in Part II.C.
C. Future Options for Regulation
In 1992, attorney Marie-France Major posited that an integral step
in ending the use of mercenaries in armed conflict was ratification of
the U.N. Mercenary Convention, along with passage of new domestic
laws defining mercenary recruitment as an offense.3 61 She also called
for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to "formulate a juridical
solution to the problem.370 Major argued that mercenarism must be
defined as a crime against humanity.37' Twelve years after Major's
writing, the U.N. Mercenary Convention has only just come into
366. Indeed, some say it would be a violation of a state's sovereign rights to forbid
use of foreign mercenary forces. See, e.g., Zarate, supra note 32, at 80; David
Kassebaum, Note, A Question of Facts-The Legal Use of Private Security Firms in
Bosnia, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 581, 593 (2000). Whatever might be said about the
use of indigenous private military forces, it is difficult, as a matter of elementary
political theory, to see how a sovereign regime could be understood to have a
sovereign right to use foreigners against some of its citizens within its borders. Cf. The
Declaration of Independence, para. 26 (U.S. 1776) (stating that at the time of the
Declaration of Independence, the King of Britain, George III, was "transporting large
Armies of foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and
tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in
the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation").
367. See Singer, supra note 1, at 536.
368. Id. South Africa's RFMAA is not immune from this problem. The minister
supervising passage of the legislation noted that South Africa would likely have to
depend on reports from journalists to enforce the law. Id.
369. Major, supra note 34, at 149-50.
370. Id. at 150.
371. Id.
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force, ratified by many countries that subsequently used
mercenaries.," No "juridical" solution exists. 373
Most PMFs would prefer to be self-regulated, relying mainly on the
market to delineate "good" and "bad" firms on the basis of efficient
performance. 74 An industry lobby group, the International Peace
Operations Association ("IPOA"), created a code of conduct for the
industry.371 The government of the United Kingdom believes,
however, that a self-policed code of conduct would not be enough if it
is lacking in external enforcement mechanisms. 376 Part II.C explores
proffered regulatory schemes, beginning with nonregulation through
default to market mechanisms.
1. The Market
While PMFs would clearly prefer industry-driven market regulation
over any international or state regime, favoring reliance on market
mechanisms is the minority opinion in scholarship. Singer notes that
"the market is not a regulatory institution, but simply a theoretic
space in which trade takes place.''377 Advocates of market control
include PMFs themselves, law professor Dino Kritsiotis, and attorney
Juan Carlos Zarate.3 78
Zarate finds PMFs to be a welcome and useful product in the
evolution of modern warfare, and claims that, up to the time of his
writing in 1998, PMFs had "restricted their contracts solely to work
for legitimate regimes or organizations. '379 Zarate does believe that
some regulation is necessary on the contingency that "the geopolitical
market may change so that the only available contracts for [PMFs] are
with disreputable governments. ' 380 With some help from domestic
regulations, Zarate believes that the market will provide all the
constraint necessary on the power of PMIFs.81 Zarate notes that PMFs
372. See 2 Multilateral Treaties, supra note 222, at 114.
373. While Milliard believes that the International Criminal Court ("ICC") may
one day have jurisdiction through the definition of "crime[s] of aggression," crimes of
aggression is not now defined. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 67-68; supra note 228
and accompanying text.
374. See Singer, supra note 1, at 543.
375. See id. The International Peace Operations Association ("IPOA") lobbies on
behalf of the PMF industry. See Singer, supra note 14, at viii.
376. UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 76. Without domestic enforcement
mechanisms a state could "be compelled to watch while a company pursued a course
that was plainly contrary to the public interest." Id.
377. Singer, supra note 1, at 543.
378. This is a minority position. See, e.g., Milliard, supra note 13; Singer, supra note
1, at 543.
379. Zarate, supra note 32, at 80.
380. Id.
381. See id. at 148-50. Zarate judges that it is in PMF firms' best interests to act
scrupulously, noting that "[i]nvolvement in controversial wars and loss of personnel
have economic consequences... morale implications.., and an impact on
reputation." Id. at 149.
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could gain, and indeed EO did gain, property rights concessions (of
mining and oil) from the countries with which they contract. 82 To
guard against failure of market regulation, Zarate proposes an
additional regime of state-based licensing."'
Kritsiotis likewise views PMFs as a "new breed of mercenary," but
also one that will "champion legitimate causes."38 He opines that the
international community erred in denying POW status to mercenaries
in Article 47 of Protocol J.385 This denial may function as a deterrent
to soldiers of fortune but is a hindrance to PMFs.186 Proponents of
market regulation believe PMFs are inevitable, focusing on the
premise that "as long as there is war, there will be a need for military
expertise. "37
2. Registration and Oversight
Even some market regulation enthusiasts, such as Zarate, recognize
the necessity of PMF regulation. Many PMF commentators agree,
and offer various solutions consisting of regulation and oversight using
both existing and new definitions of mercenary, and existing and new
international organizations and legal regimes. Two recent advocates
of registration and oversight for PMFs are Singer and U.S. Army
Judge Advocate General Todd S. Milliard.
382. Id. at 147. Zarate goes so far as to state that EO and similar firms "could...
gain hegemonic power," thus "leading a vanguard" of neo-colonialism. Id.; see also
UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 40 (calling the act of assigning mineral rights to a
PMF a "mortgaging [of] future returns"). When a state is temporarily ruled by an
occupying power after war, the occupying state has no right to exploit the occupied
state's mineral and oil resources. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 55, 36 Stat. 2277, 2309. Under the law of
occupation the exploitation of mineral and oil resources of a sovereign state by an
occupying state is limited to "the military needs of the army of occupation." Michael
Ottolenghi, Note, The Stars and Stripes in Al-Fardos Square: The Implications for the
International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2177, 2186 (2004).
383. Zarate, supra note 32, at 153. Zarate looks to the United States as an example
of such a regime. Id. Additionally, Zarate champions a new international convention
from the United Nations, bilateral agreements between supply states and employer
states, and other domestic legislation. Id. at 153-54.
384. Kritsiotis, supra note 45, at 12.
385. Id. at 14-16; see Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
386. Kritsiotis, supra note 45, at 15-17. Kritsiotis argues that mercenaries ought to
be afforded POW status. Id. at 17; see also Kwakwa, supra note 216, at 69 (arguing
that the purpose of the humanitarian laws of war is to protect not only the "victims"
of war, but all persons involved, and that "as many combatants and conflicts as
possible" should fall under the protections of the laws of war); cf Cotton, supra note
192, at 166 (seeing the question of whether mercenaries should be afforded POW
status as a "potential crisis in the international community"). Because the definition
of a mercenary in Article 47 is narrow, however, it is quite possible that a soldier of
fortune or PMF could evade classification as such. Kritsiotis, supra note 45, at 18.
387. Zarate, supra note 32, at 91.
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PMFs are businesses first and foremost, existing to earn profit and
thus may not be at all effective at self-regulation.381 If there is no
enforcement mechanism any voluntary code of conduct likely will
fail.389 "[C]ustomer satisfaction can and does conflict with the need to
avoid grave human rights violations."' 90 Members of national armies
commit human rights violations and employees of PMFs most likely
will as well. 391 When the goal is profit, as it must be for any business, it
is possible that profit may be privileged over people.392
This leaves a substantial vacuum of law?93 Milliard identifies the
most immediate problem arising out of this vacuum: The potential for
"unregulated transfer of military services to [private] armed forces."394
Milliard argues that such transfers must occur only between states, or
possibly between a state and an armed force recognized by the
international community as legitimate391 Singer and Milliard both
accept use of PMFs, coupled with registration and oversight. They
reach the same end, but get there through different philosophical
means and with differing priorities. Singer is a political scientist, and
sees the puzzle as one of controlling an inherently dangerous but
inevitable phenomenon. Milliard, a Judge Advocate General with the
U.S. Army,396 sees promise in PMFs as a means for effective
humanitarian intervention, given United Nations and individual state
inaction.
Singer believes that, because of the ability of PMFs to escape from
any one state, any effective regulation must be international9 A
388. See id. Much optimism exists for a private sector or market-based solution to
PMFs. See Isenberg, supra note 82, at 2-3.
389. Singer, supra note 1, at 543.
390. Garmon, supra note 123, at 338.
391. See id. at 339. The UCMJ and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
would cover human rights abuses carried out by a member of the United States armed
forces but, as Singer notes, not those committed by an American citizen-employee of
a PMF working for a government other than the United States. See supra notes 330-33
and accompanying text.
392. See Garmon, supra note 123, at 338. Garmon notes that "it is not
unreasonable to expect that a blind eye may be turned toward an employee's heinous
conduct." Id.
393. Singer believes that this vacuum of law "should... be of concern not only to
those who believe in the power of legal norms to shape good behavior, but also to
those who seek to provide some order to the international security sphere." Singer,
supra note 1, at 541.
394. Milliard, supra note 13, at 76.
395. Id. Milliard only sees a problem in state-to-state transfers when the receiving
state has been ostracized from the international community, as Rhodesia (now the
states of Zambia and Zimbabwe), South Africa, and Iraq have been at times. Id. at 77.
Milliard addresses this concern with his own Draft International Convention to
Prevent the Unlawful Transfer of Military Services to Foreign Armed Forces
("Milliard's Convention"). Id. at 79 & n.454, app. A.
396. See id. at 1 n.1.
397. Singer, supra note 1, at 544. A PMF may be "'no more than a retired military
guy sitting in a spare bedroom with a fax machine and a Rolodex."' Africa's Dogs of
War, supra note 253 (quoting a former American defense official).
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wholesale ban on mercenaries, Singer concludes, might be a threat to
sovereign states' right to self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.398 Singer is troubled by both the enforcement and supply-
and-demand issues that a ban on PMFs would raise.39 Singer notes
that powerful states like the United States and the United Kingdom
favor use of PMFs, making the likelihood of banning the industry
altogether politically unlikely.4°° Singer concludes that an attempt to
ban PMFs "would likely only repeat the past failures of anti-
mercenary laws."' 1
Thus, Singer proposes a hybrid international plan. He advances a
process of registration, entailing evaluation of firms' compliance with
both business and international military standards, couched in the
office of the U.N. Special Rapporteur.403  "A task force of
international experts" and stakeholders would establish rules and
monitoring mechanisms for the PMF industry, eventually forming an
international office to register, monitor, and evaluate PMFs.4°4 The
United Nations could then employ the approved firms.4° Approved
firms would carry, to other employers, a kind of seal of approval from
the United Nations making these firms more desirable military force
providers than unsanctioned firms.416 Singer envisions this office as
providing oversight of PMFs, possibly even on the ground.40 Any firm
violating its contract or the laws of war would be punished, though
Singer does not specify what this punishment would be.48
Singer supports stricter measures in the case of proven human
rights violations by PMFs, including legal sanctions in the employing
state, waiver of objection to extradition to a state with universal
jurisdiction, or some legal recourse to the ICC or an ad hoc tribunal.-
Yet Singer despairs that the world currently lacks the political will
necessary to regulate PMFs, and that such political will may only
manifest following a "massive violation. '"410
398. U.N. Charter art. 51; see Singer, supra note 1, at 544.
399. Singer, supra note 1, at 544.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 545-46.
403. Id. at 545. Similarly, Isenberg proposes a registration modeled on the U.N.
Register of Conventional Arms, thus cataloguing both client states and firms. See
Isenberg, supra note 82, at 24.
404. Singer, supra note 1, at 545.
405. Id. at 545-46.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 546.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 547. Zarate notes that provider states "have a vested interest in
retaining the option to influence foreign conflicts by allowing mercenaries to sell their
services with the possibility of denying responsibility for their actions." Zarate, supra
note 32, at 91.
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In the interim, Singer suggests several "short-term" measures to
remedy the vacuum of law surrounding PMFs.'1 1 Singer advocates
expanding the mandate of the U.N. Special Rapporteur to undertake
a study of PMFs currently operating; further ratification of the U.N.
Mercenary Convention;12 more and improved domestic laws, for
example, changing the focus of South Africa's RFMAA to the type of
services provided instead of the destination of services; making the
U.S. licensing process more transparent to enable oversight of
licensed contracts; and expanding the Military Extraterritorial Judicial
Act to cover all PMFs working abroad.411 Finally, he proposes a
unification of domestic laws based on current, positive models of state
regulation.414
Milliard, concerned with humanitarian crises, argues that PMIFs are
an ideal solution to the general reluctance of states to intervene in
small internal conflicts. 415 Milliard calls the 1994 atrocities in Rwanda
"the most poignant example" of an opportunity for effective PMF
humanitarian intervention, although he acknowledges the
unlikelihood that PMF intervention could have stopped the
genocide.416 Still, a PMF "could have seized, disabled, or simply
jammed the Hutu-controlled Radio Mille Collines," a main source of
the incitement to violence. 4 11
Milliard uses hypothetical outcomes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide
to justify use of PMFs, arguing that "[i]f there is any reasonable
possibility of averting humanitarian catastrophes" through use of
PMFs, such use should be sanctioned.418 In furtherance of this,
Milliard proposes his own Draft International Convention to Prevent
the Unlawful Transfer of Military Services to Foreign Armed Forces
("Milliard's Convention").419 Milliard's Convention proposes to
"codify states' international law responsibilities, to address concerns
about [PMF] accountability and transparency, to marginalize the
unaffiliated individual who attempts to transfer military services
without state sanction, and to buttress legitimate states' sovereign
411. Singer, supra note 1, at 547.
412. Singer hopes that, with increased ratification, the U.N. Mercenary Convention
might cease to be perceived of as "a false document propped up by a mostly
hypocritical signatory body." Id.
413. Singer notes that "such expansion of U.S. criminal law may be potentially
unenforceable." Id. at 548.
414. See id. (discussing Singer's proposals in this area).
415. Milliard, supra note 13, at 16.
416. Id. at 18. Other pro-PMF commentators have claimed that the entire
Rwandan genocide could have been prevented for $150 million. See Stephen Mbogo,
IPOA, Mercenaries? No, PMCs, at http://www.ipoaonline.org/news/091800-2.htm
(Sept. 18, 2000).
417. Milliard, supra note 13, at 18.
418. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
419. Id. at 79-80. For the full text of Milliard's Convention, see id. at 79 & n.454,
app. A.
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authority to engage in transfers of military services. '"420 Additionally,
Milliard calls for complementary domestic regulation.421
3. Moral Condemnation and Legal Fatalism
Some commentators find PMFs and mercenaries unacceptable and
seek to eradicate them. These scholars eschew entirely the
problematic practicalities of banning private violence, focusing instead
on the theoretical reasons for suppression of private violence.
Former Human Rights Watch fellow Montgomery Sapone seems to
condemn PMFs, and all privatized violence, as morally wrong. He
writes that mercenaries have been used by a significant number of
political opposition groups, arms dealers, and drug-traffickers, and
"are known to have been involved in massacres, executions, looting,
and rape. 4 22  As other scholars have noted, mercenaries are
dangerous because they are motivated by profit alone and are likely to
prolong, rather than work to end, any conflict in which they
participate.423
After surveying the circumstances behind both the condemnation in
international law, and the popularity of the mercenaries in the public
imagination, Sapone concludes that the current regime, whatever its
faults, "prevents the complete commodification of military skill by
structuring various guidelines about when and how military skill and
labor can circulate. '' 424 Equating commodification of sex and
prostitution to commodification of violence and mercenarism, Sapone
laments that "[a] world in which violence and death are bought and
sold is an empty and cold place. '" 4 25 Sapone does not, however, offer
any real solution to this commodification of violence, nor does he
directly call for an outright ban on mercenaries, PMFs, or private
violence.
4. Innovative Use of Existing Domestic Laws
Some student commentators have analyzed various existing U.S.
laws that may be used to regulate mercenaries. 426  One such
420. Id. at 79.
421. Id. at 79-80. Milliard envisions that PMFs' home states will be the sources of
regulation. Id. at 80.
422. Sapone, supra note 34, at 3.
423. Id. at 4. Sapone explores why mercenaries, who have received so much
negative legal and political attention in recent years, still capture the imagination of
"adolescent boys, readers of Soldier of Fortune [magazine], and many U.S. Army
soldiers." Id. at 4-5. Presumably, Sapone seeks to answer Major's question of "[w]hy
anyone today would want to be employed as a mercenary." Major, supra note 34, at
147.
424. Sapone, supra note 34, at 42.
425. Id. at 43.
426. In addition to the proposals outlined in this Note, one student commentator
advocates revising the Neutrality Act and Passport Act and using them to revoke the
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commentator offers the ATS427 as an "instrument for applying
international norms to P Fs."428  The ATS provides that "[tjhe
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States. '" 429  Because U.S. courts have held
customary international law to be a valid source of law in ATS suits,
both individual employees of PMFs who commit human rights abuses
and the PMF employer may be sued in the United States.4-0 It is not
clear, however, that the United States has accepted mercenarism as a
crime.31
5. PMFs and Africa
PMFs have a unique relationship to Africa.32 While African
nations are nation-states, many have "not resolved issues of nation
building and state formation," resulting in some weak states.433
Therefore, responsible PMFs could be a boon for Africa.414 Dr.
Abdel-Fatau Musah and Doug Brooks, president of the industry
passport of any citizen who acted as a mercenary in a foreign state. Grant E.
Courtney, Note, American Mercenaries and the Neutrality Act. Shortening the Leash
on the Dogs of War, 12 J. Legis. 175, 194 (1985). Another student commentator
argues that the Marque and Reprisal Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11, may enable
regulation of PMFs, the "new privateers." Gaul, supra note 116, at 1492. Finding the
AECA to be an ineffective means of regulating PMF activity, that student
commentator argues that the Marque and Reprisal Clause is an effective grant of the
Framers' intent for Congress to regulate this private violence. Id. at 1511. He believes
that PMFs are analogous to the privateers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, the constituency targeted by the Marque and Reprisal Clause, and that "the
underlying purpose of the Marque and Reprisal Clause was to prevent the executive
from avoiding congressional oversight of national military affairs by employing
privately-financed military forces." Id. at 1500-01. Ultimately, he advocates
strengthening the AECA and passing new law on the foundation of Congress's
Marque and Reprisal powers. See id. at 1520-22. He is concerned that "the new
privateers always act in the best interests of the American people." Id. at 1522.
427. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
428. Garmon, supra note 123, at 339.
429. § 1350.
430. Garmon, supra note 123, at 339-54. The ATS might be used, under Garmon's
proposal, to prosecute civilian contractors involved in the alleged abuses at Abu
Ghraib in Iraq. See Phillip Carter, How to Discipline Private Contractors: What
Consequences Do the Companies Involved in Abu Ghraib Face?, Slate, May 4, 2004, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2099954.
431. The United States has not ratified the U.N. Mercenary Convention or
Protocol I (the United States is a signatory to Protocol I). 2 Multilateral Treaties,
supra note 222, at 112; supra note 191 and accompanying text.
432. For an evaluation of PMFs in Africa, see Global Coalition for Africa, supra
note 13, at 39-47.
433. Id. at 40.
434. See supra notes 418-21 and accompanying text (describing Milliard's optimistic
view of potential humanitarian uses of PMFs).
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organization IPOA, observe that developed nations and particularly
the United States are reluctant to intervene in African conflicts.4 3
Though in favor of PMFs, these commentators are still wary of
them and recommend that mercenaries only be deployed by the
United Nations, the OAU, or their home state. These commentators
also believe that funding for PMF deployment should come from a
source other than the employing state.4 36 Musah and Brooks would
require U.N. monitoring of any PMF operation. 417 Still, Brooks states
that private forces do not have an incentive to prolong a conflict but
rather to end it, as the market will expose any inefficiency or
wrongdoing and punish the offending firms accordingly. 438
To praise the potential for use of PMFs in Africa, including in
peacekeeping operations, Brooks notes that the entire 1996 EO
contract with Sierra Leone cost $36 million, while the United Nations
spent $3 million per day for peacekeeping in Sierra Leone.4 9 The
economic efficiency of PMFs is broadly claimed in their defense. 44
Thus, the argument has returned to market efficiencies.4
The scholars discussed in Part II.C accept the existence of PMFs
and seek to find a way to regulate or control them, or despair their
existence but make no recommendations for prospective regulatory
regimes. Part III argues that ideally PMFs would not exist, as they
subvert hard-won principles of sovereignty that have been in place for
the last several centuries and, at best, can only be tenuously
controlled. Starting from Article 47 of Protocol I, Part III.A redefines
"mercenary." Though ideally supporting a total ban, Part III.B.1
recognizes that a total ban is not feasible. Therefore, the rest of Part
III.B identifies the goals of any effective regulatory regime and
recommends measures for deterrence, control, and regulation.
435. Dr. Abdel-Fatau Musah & Doug Brooks, African Peace: A Role for
Mercenaries?, Apr. 2000, at 2, at http://www.hoosier84.com/musah-brooks.pdf; see
Guns Still for Hire, supra note 3.
436. Musah & Brooks, supra note 435, at 2. "It is essential that the future of Africa
is not mortgaged out of desperation to end the wars." Id. at 1. A staunchly anti-PMF
organization agrees: "[H]iring samurai is no answer to the problems of African
states," because "samurai are not content with three bowls of rice a day." Wrigley,
supra note 132.
437. See Musah and Brooks, supra note 435, at 2. This level of monitoring may not
be realistic, as it would add significantly to the cost of PMF deployment. See infra
note 469 and accompanying text.
438. Brooks, supra note 13, at 1, 3.
439. Mbogo, supra note 416.
440. UK Green Paper, supra note 13, T 59 ("It is at least possible that if the tasks
[of peacekeeping] were put out to tender, private companies would be able to do the
job more cheaply and more effectively.").
441. See supra Part II.C.1 (exploring the possibilities of private sector or market
control for PMFs).
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III. THE FUTURE OF PMFs
"Just because we can turn something over to the private market
does not always mean we should.""' 2  States worked to monopolize
violence in history,"3 and should not casually discard this achievement.
In the "[s]tate-oriented hegemonic view," privatized violence carried
out by forces with "little loyalty to any State ... def[ies] military
norms and thus lack[s] moral legitimacy."-
Though states have never monopolized violence entirely,"4 the
hegemonic structure of the international community operates on the
premise that violence is not a commodity. 46 Additionally, PMFs and
mercenaries prove ever difficult to define.447 The current international
agreements and conventions on mercenaries use an extremely narrow
definition of mercenaries. 448 Before considering endorsing PMFs, the
international community must agree on who is and who is not a
mercenary. Only then can the international community and
individual states decide if and how to regulate mercenaries and PMFs.
A. Redefining "Mercenary"
A mercenary is "a professional soldier serving a foreign power"
who "receives payment for his services."" 9 When home states loan
their citizen soldiers to another state, those soldiers do not fall into the
literal terms defining a mercenary because they are actually fighting at
the behest of their own state.450 Those who volunteer and become part
of a foreign army do not fall into the spirit of the mercenary
definition, because, though not fighting for their home state, they are
under the control of a state, and indeed often become citizens of the
national army for which they fight. 45' These forces transfer allegiance
from one state to another state, rather than discarding state loyalty
entirely.
442. See Singer, supra note 26.
443. Thomson, supra note 48, at 107 ("Stamping out unauthorized nonstate
violence was not a mere mopping-up operation.").
444. Sapone, supra note 34, at 6.
445. See Krasner, supra note 42, at 651-52 (stating that "[s]overeignty has always
been problematic" and that "[o]nly a very few states have actually possessed all of the
major attributes that are associated with sovereignty").
446. Sapone, supra note 34, at 43 ("By preserving a discourse of nonalienablity of
military skill, we preserve the illusion that the State controls war, and that a soldier's
death cannot be bought.").
447. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 3-4; cf Best, supra note 33, at 328 n.83.
448. See Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
449. 9 The Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 65, at 618.
450. The South Korean, Thai, and Filipino soldiers that fought in South Vietnam
are not mercenaries, but forces "loaned" to another state; at most this is "disguised"
mercenarism. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
451. Recruits to the French Foreign Legion and the United States armed forces can
become citizens after a proscribed period of service. See supra notes 97, 106 and
accompanying text.
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Soldiers of fortune, who fight for the highest bidder, are clearly
mercenaries. 452 PMFs are also mercenaries because they are foreign
soldiers paid to fight and have no loyalty to their employing state.
The definition found in existing international agreements addressing
mercenaries is, however, much narrower and would exclude PMFs
and even many soldiers of fortune, allowing both groups to maneuver
out of the mercenary definition. The definition of mercenary found in
international agreements and accepted as customary international law
must be revised to reflect the contemporary reality of privatized
violence.
The definition of a mercenary found in Article 47 of Protocol I,
which denies mercenaries the right to POW status, may be adapted to
include PMFs as mercenaries. Article 47(2)(a) provides that a
mercenary must be "specially recruited locally or abroad in order to
fight in an armed conflict,"' 453  which limits recruitment and
participation to a finite engagement. This provision must be
jettisoned, as PMFs may contract employees for a period of time
rather than for a specific conflict. Subsection (b) requires that a
mercenary take "a direct part in hostilities. '" 414  These two
requirements can be both collapsed and expanded to cover PMF
employees, while allowing for use of personal bodyguards, in the
following manner:
A mercenary is any person who takes a direct part in military
activities:
(a) in a country or territory of which he is not a citizen or subject;
other than engaging in armed self-defense of state officials or private
persons under rules of engagement permitting proportionate return
of fire if fired upon or upon reasonable belief of imminent threat to
the life or safety of the protected person or persons, such use of
force in self-defense to be limited to the use of side arms or firearms
limited against enemies in visual range.
Subsection (c) of Article 47 states that a mercenary must be
motivated by "the desire for private gain.., in excess of that
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces" of the contracting party.455 This definition need not be
452. This ability to transfer loyalty is typified by Bob Denard, who fought on both
sides of a conflict in the Comoros Islands. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 93-94.
453. Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
454. Id.
455. Id. In contrast, the OAU Mercenary Convention provides that a mercenary
need only be motivated by material compensation not necessarily in excess of that
paid to the contracting states' armed forces. See OAU Mercenary Convention, supra
note 63, art. 1, 1490 U.N.T.S. at 96 (a mercenary "[i]s motivated to take part in the
hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and in fact is promised by or on
behalf of a party to the conflict material compensation"). It is worth noting that no
iteration of this provision requires that a hired soldier be paid at the rate of his home
army. South Korean troops fighting in Vietnam received "more than twenty times
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so convoluted-in this Note's proposed redefinition, it is enough that
a mercenary "takes a direct part in military activities" and "is
motivated to take part by the desire for private monetary or material
gain."
Finally, regarding nationality, Article 47 excludes any citizens or
residents of the territory of a party to the conflict, any member of the
armed forces of a party to the conflict, and those that were "sent by a
State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member
of its armed forces. '" 416 In the proposed redefinition, a mercenary is
one who "takes a direct part in military activities" if this participation
is
independent of any legal obligation, regulation, or order by the state
of which he is a citizen or subject to participate in such activity.
(Active duty members of a state's armed forces, participating with
consent of their government on official duty are in any event not
mercenaries, regardless of whether they are a citizen or subject.)
In essence, mercenaries are those combatants who take a direct part
in hostilities and who are noncitizens of the conflicting state or states,
are not sent on official state business, and are motivated by material
gain.
The proposed redefinition of "mercenary" would read as follows:
A mercenary is a person who takes a direct part in military activities:
(a) in a country or territory of which he is not a citizen or subject;
other than engaging in armed self-defense of state officials or private
persons under rules of engagement permitting proportionate return
of fire if fired upon or upon reasonable belief of imminent threat to
the life or safety of the protected person or persons, such use of
force in self-defense to be limited to the use of side arms or firearms
limited against enemies in visual range; and
(b) is motivated to take part by the desire for private monetary or
material gain; and
(c) acts independent of any legal obligation, regulation, or order by
the state of which he is a citizen or subject to participate in such
activity. (Active duty members of a state's armed forces,
participating with consent of their government on official duty are in
any event not mercenaries, regardless of whether they are citizens or
subjects.)
So redefined, PMF operatives fall into the definition of a mercenary
and, under Article 47, are not afforded POW status, and are
criminalized under the U.N. Mercenary Convention. Having
their military salaries" from the U.S. government in return for military services. Lee,
supra note 76, at 35.
456. Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
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redefined mercenaries in this way, this Note now turns to the
implications of this definition and other proposed supplementary
provisions.
B. Future Regulation
Regulation of mercenaries has thus far proved somewhat
ineffective, even for soldiers of fortune."'7  Existing mercenary
regulations did not deter former EO employees from attempting a
coup in Equatorial Guinea in 2003.48 The current definitions and
agreements must be abandoned, and a new scheme for regulation
must be put in its place.
Singer elucidates the factors to be considered in any regulatory or
prohibition scheme. 41, First, the goal of any regulatory scheme must
be clear and appropriate.- Second, the definition of which fighters
and forces fall in or fall out of any scheme must be clear and
unconfused.46 1 Third, the specific activities to be regulated must be
obviously identified. 2  Fourth, an oversight, regulatory, and
enforcement body must be denominated. 461 Finally, Singer demands
that any regulatory scheme contemplate its own cost.464 Using these
criteria, this Note examines the plausibility of a total ban on soldiers
of fortune and PMFs. Rejecting a ban as unachievable and unrealistic,
this Note next considers other specific measures to further PMF and
soldier of fortune regulation and deterrence.
1. A Total Ban Is Not Feasible
A total ban on soldiers of fortune and PMFs is philosophically
attractive, as it keeps violence from being commodified, thus
preventing death from being priced.465 Such a ban also preserves the
hegemonic order of state-monopolized violence, "provid[ing]
assurance that there is not a war machine" and keeping alive the
"ideal of nonmonetized death." 4
66
Still, violence has never been fully monopolized by the state, and
private forces have functioned throughout history.467 A total ban on
mercenary forces, using the term "mercenary" as redefined in Part
III.A, would satisfy Singer's first three requirements of a regulatory
457. Major, supra note 34, at 148-50.
458. See BBC News Q&A, supra note 8.
459. See Singer, supra note 1, at 542.
460. See id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 543.
463. Id.
464. See id.
465. See Sapone, supra note 34, at 43.
466. Id.
467. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 3.
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scheme in that it is clear what actors, activities, and forces would fall
into the prohibited activities.468 Such a ban, however, does not
adequately answer Singer's fourth and fifth requirements, that any
regulatory scheme have a clear oversight body and an identifiable
cost. How such a ban would be enforced is unclear, and the cost of
enforcement would be enormous because of the necessary monitoring
and investigation involved.469
The United States did not ratify the U.N. Mercenary Convention470
and objected to Protocol I. It is very unlikely to support a total ban
on soldiers of fortune and PMFs. The United Kingdom, as evidenced
in its Green Paper, also may demur from such a ban.471
Existing international agreements have a poor enforcement and
ratification record. The U.N. Mercenary Convention came into force
over a decade after its drafting and has not been used to prosecute any
mercenaries. Milliard's Draft Convention could replace or
supplement the existing international regime.471 Instead of wholly
condemning the use of PMFs, Milliard prescribes oversight and
licensing,473 a scheme that, in the immediate and foreseeable political
climate, may prove more palatable to the international community
and to the United States and United Kingdom, 474 two of the primary
source states. Milliard's Convention also tracks South Africa's
approach to regulation,475 tending to oversight and licensing rather
than a total ban.
A total ban, in fact, might have unintended negative consequences.
Even if PMFs are banned entirely, nation-states, particularly weak
states such as Angola and Sierra Leone, will still need to find security
somewhere. They may turn to a black market of PMFs, soldiers of
fortune, or even child soldiers.476 These forces are even less
controllable than corporate PMFs, which may be recognized and
regulated by their source state, as PMFs would be under Milliard's
Convention. Milliard's Convention, however, is not comprehensive,
focusing on source states. 47 7 Specific supplemental actions should be
taken to further deter soldiers of fortune and PMFs. These are set out
below.
468. See Singer, supra note 1, at 542-43; supra notes 466-71.
469. See Singer, supra note 1, at 542-43.
470. See 2 Multilateral Treaties, supra note 222, at 112.
471. See UK Green Paper, supra note 13.
472. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 79 & n.454, app. A.
473. Id.
474. See Singer, supra note 1, at 544 (noting that the United States and the United
Kingdom "clearly support the [PMF] industry").
475. Compare Milliard, supra note 13, at 79 & n.454, app. A, with Regulation of
Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 1 JSRSA 2-263 (2003) (S. Afr.), available
at http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-acts/1998/actl 5.pdf.
476. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
477. See Milliard, supra note 13, at 79 & n.454, app. A.
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2. Suggested Supplemental Provisions for Mercenary Regulation
This Note highlights two troubling areas affected by PMF activity
but as yet lacking in regulation or clarity: The co-opting of natural
resources and the status of PMF employees in armed combat. It also
addresses the current status of U.S. law, where laws capable of
regulating PMFs exist, but are rarely enforced.
a. Co-opting of Natural Resources
Regardless of whether private mercenaries or members of a foreign
state army on active duty render military services, states must be
prohibited from promising material compensation for military services
in the form of rights to oil or other natural resources. This prohibition
on "mortgaging future returns' 78 attempts to protect African states
from outside exploitation of natural resources. Any contract or
agreement providing for such an arrangement must be void. While
arguably paternalistic, such a provision helps decommodify military
activity and removes a significant threat and potential detriment to
African states. Africa must solve its security problems in another way.
b. Unlawful Combatants, Common Article 3, and Super-Deterrence
It should be clear that mercenaries are denied POW status under
the redefinition of mercenary, found in Part III.A, and that
mercenaries are unlawful combatants. Falling out of lawful
combatant status, mercenaries may receive the protections of common
Article 3 and Article 75 of Protocol 1.179 They must be treated
"humanely," but are not entitled to more.41°
This Note presumes that unlawful combatants are entitled to
common Article 3 protections. The United States, however, has
determined that unlawful combatants, specifically members of al-
Qaeda, are not entitled to POW status, and also are not entitled to
any Geneva protections at all, assumedly including common Article 3
protections.481 If the United States knew that its citizens, when acting
as mercenaries, would not be entitled to common Article 3
protections, perhaps it would reconsider its policy on unlawful
combatants.
478. See UK Green Paper, supra note 13, 40.
479. Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37; POW Convention, supra
note 165, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 137-38.
480. Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37.
481. Press Release, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, Statement on the
Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html (finding that no
Geneva protections apply to al-Qaeda); see Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the
President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 97, 195-200 (2004).
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If mercenaries are not afforded common Article 3 protections, this
could act as super-deterrence to those contemplating mercenary
service. While denying common Article 3 protections on the super-
deterrence rationale (which is a pragmatic rationale) is of dubious
efficacy with respect to al-Qaeda, where operatives are motivated by
religion and culture, 48 it would surely be more effective as to unlawful
combatants who choose to fight for material gain or adventure, and
who might for that reason factor the consequences of treatment upon
capture into any cost-benefit analysis.
c. Domestic Law
The need for domestic regulation of mercenaries is just as great as
the need for international regulation.483 South Africa's RFMAA
provides an excellent model for domestic regulations, in that it makes
quite clear what activities are proscribed and establishes a procedure
by which PMFs can gain governmental approval. 44
United States laws and regulations on mercenaries are not as simple
or as clear as the RFMAA, but U.S. law that might apply to
mercenaries does exist.41, The real problem is that, in the United
States, political will for enforcement of these laws against mercenaries
is lacking.486 By addressing the problem at the international level and
publicizing the problem, the public may force a change in political will
leading to greater enforcement of these germane domestic laws.481
482. Al-Qaeda operatives are "confessional mercenaries." See supra note 279 and
accompanying text.
483. Indeed, international agreements have explicitly called for complementary
domestic regulation. U.N. Mercenary Convention, supra note 63, arts. 5-6, 2163
U.N.T.S. at 97-98 (calling on state parties to "make the offenses set forth in the [U.N.
Mercenary Convention] punishable by appropriate penalties"); OAU Mercenary
Convention, supra note 63, art. 6, 1490 U.N.T.S. at 97-98 (calling on member states to
take steps to end mercenary activity within their borders).
484. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998, 1 JSRSA 2-263 to 2-
264 (2003) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-
acts/1998/act15.pdf.
485. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000); Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2000);
AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2000); ATS, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); ITAR, 22 C.F.R. § 120
(2004).
486. Singer, supra note 1, at 547.
487. It seems that awareness of PMF use by the United States government is
growing. E.g., Estes Thompson, Families Sue over Workers' Slaying in Iraq: N.C.
Security Firm Named in Lawsuit, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 2005, at A7 (regarding the four
Blackwater Security contractors killed in Fallujah, "[t]he families contend that the
company, Blackwater Security Consulting, cut corners that led to the men's deaths");
Howard Witt, Graner Led Abuse at Abu Ghraib, Witnesses Testify, Chi. Trib., Jan. 11,
2005, at A7 (noting that at Abu Ghraib, "civilian contractors appeared to be in charge
of the high-security wing and issued orders to deprive detainees of sleep, handcuff
them to walls and otherwise make them uncomfortable"); David Zucchino, Death
Without Honors, L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 2005, at Al (reporting that "contractors killed
in Iraq tend to die anonymously, mentioned only in passing").
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Domestic laws, because they inevitably suffer from a lack of
extraterritoriality and monitoring capability, particularly in weak
states, must be standardized (as much as is possible). Convergence of
domestic law also will provide evidence of customary international
law.488
CONCLUSION
Though violence has never been perfectly monopolized by the state,
suppression of privatized violence was an important step in the
evolution of the modern nation-state.8 9 The international community
continues to be organized into nation-states, 490 and states or regions
that deviate from this scheme are seen as outliers (and even broken),
not as innovators.4 91 While it is conceivable that the nation-state
regime is neither inevitable nor ideal, it is the current dominant
system of international organization.
Privatized violence poses a threat to the nation-state regime, both
actually and through appearance. Since the initial state-sponsored
suppression of private violence at the rise of the nation-state, 49 there
were occasional outbreaks of non-state violence,493 but these incidents
remained at the margins of the international, state-driven hegemony.
But, when the Cold War ended and developed nations-particularly
the United States-downsized their militaries and the colonial powers
withdrew from Africa, the PMF was invented (or reinvented).494
Private violence is creeping in from the margins to the mainstream
and "corporate warriors" now fight battles across the globe .4 5
The term "mercenary" merits a new definition, one that
encompasses PMFs. Thus the international community must
reconsider mercenaries to include any person who takes a direct part
in military activities in a country of which he is not a citizen (other
than engaging in self-defense of state officials or other persons under
appropriate and restricted rules of engagement); is motivated by
desire for private gain; and acts independent of any state order or
legal obligation.496
488. See Restatement, supra note 152, § 103 cmt. c.
489. See Thomson, supra note 48, at 77-84 (stating that the suppression of
mercenaries began in the period of the Napoleonic Wars and the United States
Neutrality Act of 1794, and continued into the nineteenth century).
490. See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 2-4.
491. See supra notes 53, 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing failed states).
492. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the first neutrality laws).
493. The activities of soldiers of fortune in Africa in the 1960s were such incidents,
being both geographically and temporally finite. See supra Part I.A.4 (discussing
activities of soldiers of fortune).
494. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing "corporate" forms of private violence).
495. See supra note 119 and accompanying text for a list of some states in which
PMFs have operated. Indeed, funds from the International Monetary Fund were
used to pay EO for work in Sierra Leone. Isenberg, supra note 82, at 10.
496. See supra Part III.A (discussing this Note's redefinition of a mercenary).
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Whether, or how much, private violence is acceptable is ultimately
for the politicians to determine. 497 The growing phenomenon of
"corporate warriors," however, must no longer be ignored. The
international community and individual states must begin a debate
about these "new" mercenaries,'98 lest nations one day find that
corporations are committing torture in Tajikistan, that private citizens
own the rights to all of Sudan's oil, or that MPRI is fighting its own
land war in Somalia.499
497. See supra Parts III.B.2.b-c (discussing the possibility of a sea change in
domestic political will).
498. Mercenaries must be defined to include PMFs. See supra Part III.A (offering a
redefinition of mercenary to include PMFs).
499. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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